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Under customary international law, many high-ranking state officials enjoyed exemption from 
prosecution by foreign criminal or civil jurisdictions for crimes committed. However, with the 
advent of the International Criminal Court, whether personal immunity as a valid defence exists 
before international and domestic tribunals remains questionable. This research interrogates 
the extent to which a sitting head of state charged with an international crime can rely on 
personal immunity. The study analyses the leading case of the former Sudanese head of state; 
Al-Bashir from 2009, by the Pre-trial Chamber of the ICC and the involvement of other 
independent states in this process and the developments made answering the question of 
whether immunity remains.  
This study addresses the conflicting tensions that states have faced, not only in terms of articles 
27 and 98 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (hereafter Rome Statute), 
but also other conflicting obligations which have made successful execution of arrest and 
prosecution difficult. These include membership of the African Union as well as the lack of 
capacity and structure of member states to execute such requests. In addition, the fact that heads 
of state may no longer enjoy immunity, whether personal or otherwise, threatens the very 
sovereignty of states. 
 
Based on the findings of this study, it can be stated that personal immunity accorded to a head 
of state can no longer be raised as a valid defence before an international tribunal. However, 
the same cannot be said of foreign domestic tribunals. This study concludes that a sitting head 
of state charged for breaking the rules of international law can be subjected to the jurisdiction 
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                 Introduction 
 
1.1    Introduction and Background to the Study 
 
International crimes are not solely of concern to one state rather in the interest of the 
international community as a whole. Thus, it should be fitting that the international community 
is empowered to prosecute international crimes regardless of where the crimes occurred and 
against whom the crimes are committed. 
Therefore, the international criminal law is defined as the law that deals with different 
categories of human conduct and when such human conduct is considered a violation of 
international humanitarian law and human rights.1  
Further, international criminal law covers norms/rules that regulate criminal responsibility 
under international law. The following categories of crime are considered international crimes:  
crimes such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and the crime of aggression.2  
In terms of international criminal law, heads of state can be liable under international law for 
international crimes (jus cogens) regardless of what state law dictates. It is based on this 
principle that a state’s obligation to prosecute or extradite violators arises. Jus cogens over the 
years has become a subject of debate both at the international and domestic spheres.3 
The reason why such a principle is important is because “criminal accountability for serious 
crimes is of fundamental importance with regards to the respect for the rule of law, deterrence 
of future violations, and the provision of redress and justice for victims”. Further, this principle 
touches the core of what humanity considers to be repugnant such as threatening world peace 
etc.4 
In light of the universal nature of such international crimes, the ability to prosecute these crimes 
derives from the fact that these crimes are of such a serious nature that they pose a threat to the 
international legal order as a whole. Further, Protocol II of the Geneva Convention therefore 
creates an obligation on states that have ratified the convention for prosecuting serious crimes 
 
1 LC Green ‘Is there an international criminal law’ (1983) 21 Alberta LR 251-261. 
2 Ibid. 
3 AJ Colangelo ‘Jurisdiction, immunity, legality, and jus cogens’ (2013) 14 Chicago J Int'l L 53 at 73. 




and breaches of treaty, whenever the offenders are found in the ratified states territory. Whether 
or not the offence took place in the specific territory, the convention requires states to pass 
national legislation that criminalises war crimes at a domestic level. This enables states to 
prosecute offenders while entering those territories.5 
Universal jurisdiction transcends that of national sovereignty since: 
“The exercise of extra-territorial jurisdiction overrides the principle that one state will not 
intervene in the internal affairs of another. It does so because, where international crime is 
concerned, that principle cannot prevail”.6 
However, the problem with this area of law is that it has been slow in its development of legal 
principles/ principles into a viable legal system. This is due to several factors for example, state 
sovereignty that acts as a shield to prosecution of heads of state. 
In addition, state sovereignty that had in the past allowed states to exercise exclusive power 
over their citizens has been eroded by the international protection of individuals as well as the 
movement of international criminal responsibility of individuals. Essentially this means that 
exceptions have been created to this exclusivity over state power by recognising certain rights 
and privileges that attach to individuals which the state cannot infringe. 
For example, although customary international law rules provide for both personal and 
functional immunity there appears to be a trend towards moving away from granting immunity. 
In the case of  R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate ex parte Pinochet Ugarte 
(no 3),7 which was a domestic court decision, the House of Lords, after analysing the principle 
of immunity, removed the immunity of the former head of state of Chile in terms of customary 
international law.8 Furthermore, the Court held that such immunity would have remained in 
force had he been a sitting head of state.”9 This creates the impression that the Court’s view 
such conduct in a serious light and worthy of prosecution.  
 
5 S Black ‘Universal jurisdiction and Syria: A treaty based expansion of universal jurisdiction as a solution to 
impunity’, (2018) 21 Int'l Trade & Bus LR 177 at 188. 
6 S Knuchel ‘State immunity and the promise of jus cogens’ (2011) 9 NW U J Int'l Hum Rts 149 at 150. 
7 [2000] 1 AC 147 at 190 (HL). 
8 R (Pinochet Ugarte) v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate [2000] 1 AC 61; see also J Needham 
‘Protection or prosecution for Omar Al-Bashir? The changing state of immunity in international criminal law’ 
(2011) 17 Auckland U L R 219 at 227. 
9 Bow Street supra paras 63-5; see also Needham op cit n8 at 227. 
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So while removing immunity, the case still seemed to suggest that immunity was guaranteed 
under customary international law.  The case of Arrest Warrant10 against the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC) was the first decision to examine the principle of immunity 
accorded to a high-ranking state official. The case confirmed that immunity in terms of 
customary international law can be extended to foreign ministers prosecuted in foreign courts 
for actions undertaken while in office.11Although jus cogens was not expressly mentioned in 
the case, the prohibition against committing such offences did not override rules of 
international law. 
However, with the establishment of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(hereafter the Rome Statute), which is a court that aims to end to impunity for serious 
international crimes; in terms of Article 5 of the Rome Statute,12 the court will only be able to 
exercise jurisdiction on the basis of the principle of territoriality and that of active personality. 
Active personality is a principle in terms of international law that grants a state the right to 
exercise jurisdiction when a crime is committed outside its territory.13 This essentially means 
that all other cases will have to be dealt with by means of the principle of universal jurisdiction 
of domestic courts. All states can exercise universal jurisdiction concerning serious offences 
such as genocide regardless of the nationality of the offender or where the crime was 
committed. This has developed as a matter of state practice. Universal jurisdiction is therefore 
not contrary to the principle of complementarity in the Rome Statute since states will always 
have a role to play in investigating and prosecuting core crimes. The problem lies with the 
interpretation of some articles set out in the Rome Statute which create confusion as to whether 
perpetrators can be prosecuted before the Court. On the one hand, the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) is established by means of treaty and therefore is in the same position to exercise 
universal jurisdiction regarding core crimes as contracting parties to the ICC themselves.  
Article 27 of the Rome Statute clearly bars the application of head of state immunity. It 
provides that “immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity 
of a person, whether under national or international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising 
its jurisdiction over such a person.” 
 
10 ‘Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. 
Belgium) International Court of Justice (ICJ),’ (14 February 2002), available at: https://www refworld.org/ 
cases,ICJ,3c6cd39b4 html [Accessed on 10 February 2020]. 
11  Ibid para 55.  
12 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 27 of 2002. 
13 C Ryngaert Jurisdiction in international law 2nd ed (2008) 104. 
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It should be noted that cooperation is central to the success of the International Criminal Court. 
The drafters of the statute emphasised the importance of the obligations which member states 
have with regard to cooperation.14 This is because the Court does not have all the tools 
necessary to achieve its objectives which include ensuring the worst perpetrators are held 
accountable for their crimes, to serve as a court of last resort that can investigate, prosecute and 
punish the perpetrators of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.15 Therefore the 
Court is entirely reliant on the cooperation of member states, and this is set out in detail in part 
9 of the Rome Statute. This part deals with the arrest and surrender of a suspect sought by the 
Court.16 
While Article 27 of the Rome Statute bars the application of immunity in proceedings before 
the Court, Article 98 provides for immunity as an exception to cooperation with the ICC.17 In 
addition, Article 27(2) states that any immunity or special procedural rule which attaches to 
the official capacity of head of state under national or international law, shall not bar the court 
from exercising jurisdiction over such an individual. This now creates a deviation from the 
traditional general rule that sitting heads of states enjoy personal and functional immunity.  
This seems to create a conflict between the two articles, which will be elaborated on in Chapter 
3 and critiqued in Chapter 4. 
In addition, it has also raised questions as to whether state parties to the Rome Statute are 
required to meet such obligations as set out in Article 27 and 98, in light of other conflicting 
obligations they may face. For example, where state parties are also members of the African 
Union, this may place a heavy reliance on Article 98 of the Rome Statute as a reason to refuse 
compliance with the requests of the ICC. Further, as a member state to the African Union, non-
compliances or non-implementation of regulations and directives from the assembly shall 
attract appropriate sanctions from the organisation. The commitment to the AU as a regional 
 
14 D Nsereko ‘Triggering the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court’ (2004) 2 AHRLJ 265. 
15 I Eberechi ‘Armed conflicts in Africa and western complicity: A disincentive for African Union's cooperation 
with the ICC’ (2009) Afr J Legal Stud 54. 
16 Part 9 provides that “States Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Statute, cooperate fully with 
the Court in its investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.” 
17 Art. 98 of the Rome statute provides that.  
“1. The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance which would require the 
requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international law with respect to the State 
or diplomatic immunity of a person or property of a third State, unless the Court can first obtain the 
cooperation of that third State for the waiver of the immunity.  
2. The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which would require the requested State to 
act inconsistently with its obligations under international agreements pursuant to which the consent of a 
sending State is required to surrender a person of that State to the Court, unless the Court can first obtain 
the cooperation of the sending State for the giving of consent for the surrender.” 
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organisation was prioritised because of regional political reputation.18 Further, a non-
compliance policy which was issued in 2009 by the AU remains the primary reason behind the 
strained relationship between the AU and the ICC.19 In addition, it is questionable whether non-
state parties can be subject to the jurisdiction of this Court in terms of Article 13 of the Rome 
Statute.20 
 
1.2    Rationale and Assumptions and Research Questions 
 
This research rests on the following assumptions. The United Nations General Assembly 
recognised the need for a permanent international court to deal with the kinds of atrocities 
which had been perpetrated, this was in 1948. The international community created and 
ratified the Rome Statute to end impunity21 for those perpetrators charged with the most 
serious offences as set out in Article 5 of the Rome Statute. One of the reasons for its 
establishment, was because most of the offensive conduct carried out during the world wars 
violated international law and remained unpunished. Thus, where countries have ratified such 
a statute, this raises the assumption that there is an obligation on them to prosecute such 
perpetrators. One of the most notorious cases in modern times which is the focus of this 
dissertation, is the alleged atrocities committed by the former President of Sudan Al-Bashir.22  
 On 14 July 2008, the prosecution filed an application and the Pre-trial Chamber and issued a 
warrant of arrest for Al-Bashir.23 The prosecutor filed a second application requesting a second 
warrant of arrest for Al-Bashir and in this warrant, genocide was included alongside  the 
previous crimes mentioned  namely war crimes and crimes against humanity.24 There is a duty 
on the international community to hold him responsible for such atrocities. The problem is that 
African state parties to the ICC also have a duty in terms of the AU not to cooperate with such 
 
18 D Tladi ‘Cooperation, immunities, and article 98 of the Rome Statute: The ICC, interpretation, and conflicting 
norms’ (2012) 106 Amer Soc Int’l L 307-308. 
19 F Boehme We chose Africa’: South Africa and the regional politics of cooperation with the International 
Criminal Court (2017) 11 Int’l J Transit Jus 50–70, https://doi-org.ukzn.idm.oclc.org/10.1093/ijtj/ijw024. 
20 Art. 13(b)8 provides that the ICC may exercise jurisdiction where “[a] situation in which one or more of such 
crimes [crimes referred to in Article 5] appears to have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the 
Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations”. 
21 S Anoushirvani ‘The future of the International Criminal Court: The long road to legitimacy begins with the 
trial of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo’ (2010) 22 Int'l L Rev 213 at 214. 
22 ‘In the Case of The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir “Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad 
Al-Bashir’ (4 March 2009), (ICC-02/05-01/09-1). 
23 ‘In the Case of The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir’Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad 
Al-Bashir Second Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir’ (July 12, 2010) (C-ICC-02/05-01/09-
95).  
24 In the Case of the Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir supra n23.  
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requests for arrest and surrender. This raises the question as to how such state parties should 
be dealt with for non-compliance.  In addition, although Sudan is not a signatory to the Rome 
Statute, it appears as if this state can still be brought within the jurisdiction of the Court. This 
is salient in light of the fact that Sudan is a member of the UN as well as the Geneva 
Conventions.25 In addition, Sudan is also a member of the Genocide Convention.26 This also 
creates certain rights and obligations towards this body and Conventions and by implication 
towards the international community at large. In light of this, it is necessary to consider whether 
it is possible to hold President Al-Bashir responsible for the crimes and to determine the basis 
for such liability. 
Therefore, the main research question this dissertation aims to answer is: “Is the immunity 
(personal and functional immunity) granted to a head of state justified before foreign and 
domestic tribunals? 
In light of the fact that there are conflicting principles which will determine such liability, it is 
necessary to consider the following sub-questions: 
1. What is the current position in customary international law on sovereign immunity in 
the context of international criminal law?  
2. Under what circumstances can the ICC exercise jurisdiction over a non-state member? 
3. Does Security Council Resolution 1593 give the ICC jurisdiction over Sudan and if so, 
what is the effect of this Resolution on the sovereign immunity that Al-Bashir as a 
former head of state enjoyed under customary international law? 
4. What is the interrelationship between Articles 27(2) and 98(1) of the Rome Statute and 
how does Security Council Resolution 1593 resolve the apparent tension between these 
Articles?  
 
1.3    Research Methodology  
 
This study is a desk top study involving interrogation of primary and secondary sources. The 
data used for research purposes has been extracted through a search of the various international 
law journals and cases on the topic of immunity. Primary sources, such as case law, 
international treaties such as the Rome Statute of ICC, as well as domestic legislation such as 
the Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges Act 37 of 2001 have been consulted. Secondary 
 
25 The Geneva Conventions of 1949. 
26 UN General Assembly ‘Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide’ 1948. 
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sources included books, journal articles, and internet sources. Both international and domestic 
instruments on personal immunity and its application before tribunals were analysed.  
 
1.4    Structure of the Dissertation 
 
This dissertation consists of five chapters. The following chapter outline presents the structure 
and flow of the study:   
Chapter one is a general introductory chapter. The chapter outlines background of the study, 
the critical questions and the objectives of the study, the research methodology applied and the 
structure of the study. 
Chapter two provides a discussion of the customary law position of immunity. It commences 
with a historical overview of the development of the principle of immunity as well as an 
explanation of the rationale of immunity. The different types of immunity will be canvassed.  
In addition, before the establishment of the International Criminal Court, different types of 
tribunals that dealt and addressed issues concerning immunity will be examined.  
Chapter three will set out the position of the ICC. It will include a discussion of the 
development of the Court. It will also set out the relevant articles that require state cooperation, 
that of Articles 27 and 98.  It will also consider the application of the Rome Statute before 
foreign and domestic courts. Last, the effect of the UNSC Resolution 1593 on non-member 
states will be considered as will the obligation that African states have towards the AU. 
Chapter four will critically analyse the link between Articles 27(2) and 98(1) of the Rome 
Statue. It will also examine Security Council Resolution 1593 pertaining to the Al-Bashir case 
and how these provisions can be reconciled with the provisions in the ICC statute. 




Customary International Law and Immunity 
2.1 Introduction  
The aim of this chapter is to discuss the customary international law position pertaining to 
personal and functional immunity by addressing the foundational concepts that underlie the 
principle of immunity. The chapter will commence by defining the concept of immunity as a 
legal provision available to high-ranking state officials, in pursuance of carrying out their 
official duties. This chapter will also consider the different forms of immunity available, and 
the rationale underlying the concept of state sovereignty. In addition, this chapter will also 
examine the current customary international law status of immunity through proceeding to 
examine the differences of such immunity before domestic and international tribunals. This 
discussion will demonstrate that courts are taking the stance that immunity for international 
crimes while no longer appearing to be applicable, has not as yet developed into a rule of 
customary international law. This in part could be attributed to the manner of the establishment 
of the tribunal concerned whether through UNSC Resolution or whether through treaty-based 
decision.  
 
2.2 Definition of Immunity 
 
Immunity is a principle that protects a state’s high ranking officials from being subjected to 
civil or criminal prosecution before a  court and is encompassed in the principle “par in parem 
non habet imperium,” which means “an equal has no power over an equal.”27 Therefore, in 
terms of this principle, a state is vested with the authority to govern its territory, manage its 
people, its affairs, and make important decisions without the interference of another state.28 
Since immunity originates from this principle, the jurisdiction which a state has over its citizens 
is restricted and therefore one state cannot claim jurisdiction over another.29   
 
Although this principle is based upon the act of the state doctrine of sovereignty, immunity is 
further guaranteed by several other instruments, treaties, or statutes. The Vienna Convention 
 
27 S Wirth Immunities, related problems, and Article 98 of the Rome Statute Criminal Law Forum (2002) 429 at 
430. 
28 Charter of the United Nations, Article 2(1) General Assembly Res 2625 (xxv) (1970). 
29 EH Franey Immunity, individuals and international law: Which individuals are immune from the jurisdiction of 
national courts under international law? LLD (London School of Economics) (2009) 16. 
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on Diplomatic Relations (1961), for example, recognises immunity as an important factor that 
contributes to the relationship that exists between countries and adds value to the growth of 
such interactions.  What is clear is that immunity is a principle developed not for the benefit of 
the individual; rather, it is for ensuring the efficiency of diplomatic functions.30 Immunity is 
not only observed by domestic courts, but by international tribunals as well. Thus, it becomes 
topical when customary international law clearly recognises immunity, but international 
tribunals such as the ICC do not.31 The principle of “par in parem non habet imperium” is 
arguably the core reason for the controversy surrounding the Al-Bashir case. This is because if 
states are expected to govern their own internal affairs without any external interference, it 
would explain why Sudan’s former president was not arrested, when the warrant of arrest was 
issued against him by the ICC, when he visited various African countries such as Malawi, Chad 
and South Africa. It can be argued that member states to the Rome Statute saw the arrest of Al-
Bashir for the crimes committed in Sudan-Darfur as an obligation of the Sudanese government 
in light of the Security Council Resolution 1593. This will be addressed in more detail in 
Chapter 4. 
Therefore, what then is the rationale for according heads of state immunity, if the principle of 
par in parem non habet imperium is arguably one of the reasons for the controversy?  Before 
this question can be answered, it should be noted that the immunity accorded to a head of state 
derives from customary international law, which is because of a broader concept, state 
immunity. These include sovereignty and equality. The sovereign was traditionally viewed as 
the embodiment of the state. As a personnification of the state, his dignity was regarded as the 
dignity of the state, and as such, any action which offended the sovereign would be an offence 
against the state.32 
 
 
30 Preamble: The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961.  
31 The Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir ‘Decision on the Cooperation of the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo Regarding Omar Al-Bashir’s Arrest and Surrender to the Court ICC’-(ICC-02/05-01/09-195) (April 
2014);  “The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir ‘Decision Pursuant to Article 87(7) on the Failure 
of the Republic of Chad to comply with the cooperation Request issued by the Court with respect and Surrender 
of Omar Hassan Ahmed Al-Bashir’ (December 2011) (ICC-02/05-01/09); and The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan 
Ahmad Al-Bashir ‘Decision Pursuant to Article 87(7) on the Failure of the Republic of Malawi to comply with 
the cooperation request issued by the Court with respect and Surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmed Al-Bashir’(ICC-
02/05-01/09-139-Corr). 
32 Franey op cit n29 at 55, 59. 
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Franey notes that one of the justifications for immunity was based on the equality of all states, 
thus, an equal cannot claim authority over another equal or allow the interference of a state 
over the jurisdiction of another.33   
Thus, the principle of immunity is more a mechanism that protects state jurisdictions from 
being violated or removed by third party states. Furthermore, if immunity were removed, then 
such removal can only be done through a waiver by the state of that particular official.34 The 
Latin maxim “par in parem non habet imperium” provides a rationale upon which immunity 
is accorded. This principle is applicable in every state and is reflected in Article 2(1) of the 
Charter of the United Nations. In terms of this principle, states are free to decide and determine 
their own internal affairs without external interference.35  
 
Further, the need for diplomatic relations between states further supports functional 
immunity.36 The ability of officials to execute their duties efficiently in office facilitates 
friendly relationships between nations and maintains international peace and security.37 Article 
29 of the Special Mission Conventions ensures that high-ranking state officials are able to carry 
out special duties or missions for the states and such principle is not for individual’s benefit.38 
Finally, functional immunity can assist in preventing disputes between states and promote 
international relations.39 
 
Although immunity is important in its own right, it is notable that state practice and opinio juris 
have confirmed that the provision of immunity does not stop the prosecution of crimes that 
violate international law and it is also not a mitigating factor for punishment.40 Initially the 
notion of absolute immunity41 meant that all official acts were covered in terms of the principle 
of immunity regardless of whether such conduct or act was criminal or not. However, this 
notion became problematic as it left states without recourse. In addition, there are differences 
between sovereign and non-sovereign acts and differences between the categories of persons 
 
33 Franey op cit n29 at 55, 59 
34 P Oguno ‘The concept of state immunity under international law: An overview’ (2016) 2(5) Int’l J L 18.   
35 Franey op cit n29 at 60. 
36 Franey op cit n29 at 60. 
37 Franey op cit n29 at 61. 
38 Convention on Special Missions, 1969. 
39 Franey op cit n29 at 61. 
40 Al-Adsani v United Kingdom (2001) 34 EHHR 273,  Dissenting Opinion of Judges Rozaskis and Caflisch joined 
by Judges Wildhaber, Costa, Cabral Barreto and Viji. 
41 Oguno op cit n34 at 15.  
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entitled to such immunity. It is now necessary to consider the historical background of the 
development of immunity as well as case law development.  
 
2.3. Historical Background and Rational of Immunity in Terms of Customary International 
Law 
 
There are two primary forms of international law. The first form is customary international law  
and the second form is that of treaty.42 However, in this section of the chapter, the focus is on 
customary international law and how it relates to immunity. This form of international law is 
followed and observed by governments and ensures that such rules are complied with. 
Furthermore, customary international law is also known as the rule or principle that is included 
in a nation’s domestic statutes and are rules of decision, or a defence, or a canon of statutory 
construction.43 
 
Therefore, upon such basis, the violations of customary international law could become 
grounds for war or international claims.44 Customary international law is known as “the 
collection of international behavioural regularities that nations over time come to view as 
binding as a matter of law.” Further, in terms of this definition, there are two elements which 
it comprises. The first element is the objective element commonly known as the “widespread 
and uniform practice of nations.” 45 The second element is central to the definition of customary 
international law and is known as opinio juris. This requirement is often referred to as the 
“psychological” or “subjective element.” Opinio Juris is one aspects of customary international 
law that is used to “distinguish a national act done voluntarily or out of comity from one that a 
nation follows because it is required to do so by law.”46  
 
The International Court of Justice47 also provides one of the most cited and authoritative 
definitions of customary international law. In addition, it is viewed as “international custom, 
and as evidence of general practice accepted as law,” 48 as provided for in terms of Article 38 
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. This explains the position of and the role 
 
42JL Goldsmith and EA Posner ‘A theory of customary international law’ (1999) 66 U Chicago L R 1113.  
43  Goldsmith & Posner op cit n42 at 1114. 
44 Goldsmith & Posner op cit n42 at 1114. 
45 Goldsmith & Posner op cit n42 at 1114. 
46 Goldsmith & Posner op cit n42 at 1114. 
47 Article 38 of the International Court of Justice.  
48 AT Guzman ‘Saving customary international law’ (2005) 27(1) Mich J Int’l L 123.    
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that customary international law operates in, that it is central to international law and a primary 
source of universal law.49 Further, it is clear that the development of customary international 
law is attributed to serious and constant state practices and opinio juris which is crystalised to 
be recognised as legally binding.50 It is upon such rules that immunity from prosecution is 
established for heads of state or high-ranking officials. Immunity is not only established in 
terms of customary international law, but it is also established in terms of statutory provisions. 
The following statutory provisions recognise immunity: State Immunity Act 1978, Diplomatic 
Immunities and Privileges Act, 2001 and the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 
1961. The latter stipulates who is entitled to immunity, as well as the functions or position that 
guarantees such privileges, the duration of immunity and in case of death.51 
 
Furthermore, regarding state immunity, there are judicial decisions which are examples of state 
practise and often these are indications of opinio juris. In the case of Jones v The Ministry52 the 
Court’s main aim was to determine if there were any form of exception for immunity in terms 
of customary international law for the state or its agent. It was held that with regards to 
immunity, “there are evidence or enough precedence to show when a foreign state is entitled 
to claim immunity for its servants and such right to immunity cannot be circumvented by suing 
its servants or agents.”53 This is because immunity as a rule of customary international law 
originates from a broader concept, the principle of equality of state and independence of state. 
 
49 Guzman op cit n48 115.     
50 Al-Adsani v United Kingdom supra 284. 
51 Article 39(1-4) Vienna Convention states:  
“1.Every person entitled to privileges and immunities shall enjoy them from the moment he enters the 
territory of the receiving State on proceeding to take up his post or, if already in its territory, from the 
moment when his appointment is notified to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs or such other ministry as 
may be agreed.  
2.When the functions of a person enjoying privileges and immunities have come to an end, such 
privileges and immunities shall normally cease at the moment when he leaves the country, or on expiry 
of a reasonable period in which to do so, but shall subsist until that time, even in case of armed conflict. 
However, with respect to acts performed by such a person in the exercise of his functions as a member 
of the mission, immunity shall continue to subsist.   
3. In case of the death of a member of the mission, the members of his family shall continue to enjoy the 
privileges and immunities to which they are entitled until the expiry of a reasonable period in which to 
leave the country. 
4. In the event of the death of a member of the mission not a national of or permanently resident in the 
receiving State or a member of his family forming part of his household, the receiving State shall permit 
the withdrawal of the movable property of the deceased, with the exception of any property acquired in 
the country the export of which was prohibited at the time of his death. Estate, succession and inheritance 
duties shall not be levied on movable property the presence of which in the receiving State was due solely 
to the presence there of the deceased as a member of the mission or as a member of the family of a 
member of the mission.” 
52 Jones v The Ministry of Interior for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia case no [2006] UKHL 26, paras 10, 59-63. 
53 Jones v the Ministry of Interior supra para 10. 
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This explains the difficulty in determining the application of immunity or its obligation in terms 
of the law.  
In the case of Schooner Exchange v. Mcfaddon54 the question was whether the court had 
jurisdiction over a case in terms of customary international law. On the basis of sovereignty, a 
state has absolute immunity over its own territory but could also waive such jurisdiction either 
impliedly, or expressly. However, a foreign state/agent is generally presumed to be free from 
jurisdiction of domestic courts in terms of customary international law.55 The principle of “par 
in parem non habet imperium” is applicable in all states and it is reflected in Article 2(1) of 
the Charter of the United Nations.56 In terms of this principle, states are free to decide and 
determine their own internal affairs without external interference.57  
 
The above discussion demonstrates that the principle of sovereignty opposes the interference 
of external parties. However, since it is a principle observed as a state practice, it can also mean 
that its existence and observation is dependent upon states’ previous practice. This emphasises 
the point that immunity applies because of the state’s existence and function of the office of 
the state official and not on the individual in the office itself. Therefore, if a state ceases to 
observe this type of immunity, what consequences will follow such an act?  It is now necessary 
to examine the differences in the treatment of categories of officials that are entitled to 
immunity. 
  
2.4 Categories of Persons Entitled Immunity 
a) Introduction to The Different Categories of Immunity  
 
In terms of the doctrine of immunity (functional), the general rule is that every act performed 
by diplomats or state officials is inviolable. This also means that the officials cannot be subject 
to civil or criminal jurisdiction. Therefore, “immunity is well established in international law 
as a possible obstacle to prosecuting international crimes.”58 The benefit of this type of 
immunity; i.e. functional, is that it allows heads of state or senior officials to travel freely and 
 
54 Schooner Exchange v Mcfaddon 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). 
55 Schooner Exchange v Mcfaddon supra. 
56 United Nations Charter 1945, Article 2. 
57 Franey op cit n29 at 60. 




conduct their roles without fear of prosecution.59 Furthermore, the Vienna Convention codified 
existing laws and established new rules of law, in order to highlight and emphasise the 
importance or necessity of diplomatic relations.60 In terms of Article 31(1) of the Vienna 
Convention, “a diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the 
receiving State. He shall also enjoy immunity from its civil and administrative jurisdiction.”61 
However, mutual consent is essential because states cannot engage or participate in diplomatic 
relations without it.62 Furthermore, since immunity is recognised for the benefit of the state, an 
obligation to respect such privileges arises. Only states vested with such authority, can waive 
it.63 There are theories that supports this principle and these include the “extraterritoriality” 
theory, the “representative character” theory and the “functional” theory.64 The 
“extraterritoriality” theory regards the diplomatic premises as an extension of the territory of 
the sending state abroad; since it falls under the jurisdiction of the sending state, it cannot be 
subjected to the host country’s authority.65 In terms of the “representative character” theory, 
the diplomatic mission personifies the sending state. Finally, in terms of the functional theory, 
in order to execute and perform certain duties, it is required that the diplomat be accorded 
immunities and privileges.66 The Vienna Convention emphasised the necessity of diplomatic 
relations in the proficient conduct of international relations, and consequently, it has codified 
existing law and established others.67 Once a state consents to a proposed diplomatic mission, 
it has a duty or obligation to respect immunity of these agents.68 In essence, while immunity 
 
59 Ibid; see also Arrest Warrant supra at par 55. Article 29 of the Special Mission Conventions is provided to 
ensure that high-ranking state officials are able to carryout special duties or missions on behalf of the states and 
not for the state official’s individual benefit. 
60 Article 32 of the Vienna Convention supra note 28. 
61 Article 31 of the Vienna Convention Supra note 28. 
62 Article 2 of the Vienna Convention Supra note 28. 
63 ET Aniche ‘A critical examination of the British municipal court rulings on cases of international immunity: 




67 Article 2 of the Vienna Convention states that “The establishment of diplomatic relations between States, and 
of permanent diplomatic missions, takes place by mutual consent.” 
68 Article 31 of the Vienna Convention stipulates that: 
“1. A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State. He shall also 
enjoy immunity from its civil and administrative jurisdiction, except in the case of: (a) A real action relating 
to private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving State, unless he holds it on behalf of 
the sending State for the purposes of the mission; (b) An action relating to succession in which the diplomatic 
agent is involved as executor, administrator, heir or legatee as a private person and not on behalf of the sending 
State; (c) An action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in 
the receiving State outside his official functions. 
2. A diplomatic agent is not obliged to give evidence as a witness. 
3. No measures of execution may be taken in respect of a diplomatic agent except in the cases coming 
under subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c) of paragraph 1 of this article, and provided that the measures 
concerned can be taken without infringing the inviolability of his person or of his residence. 
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does benefit the state, it can be waived by the state.69 Therefore, diplomatic immunity is well-
defined in terms of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961, and the following 
types of immunity are defined in the convention. 
b) Consular Immunity  
 
These officers act as representatives of their countries in foreign states and assist nationals who 
live in those states. In terms of this type of immunity, the consular officer is guaranteed 
protection from legal proceedings or the jurisdiction of the domestic court in his or her place 
of work.70 Law enforcement authorities are required in terms of the international rules of law 
to accord and extend privileges and immunities to members of foreign diplomatic missions.  
c) Immunity of International Organizations and Their Agents  
 
Immunity and it various privileges are also extended to the United Nations representatives and 
officials for official purpose and functions. These privileges are accorded in terms of Article 
105(2) of the United Nations Charter, and are extended to those officials under a foreign 
authority or jurisdiction. Further, these principles are expounded in terms of the Privileges and 
Immunities of the United Nations (UN) Convention 1946.71 
In addition, the principle only became accepted in the 1970’s by most states. The headquarters 
agreement was entered into in 1974 by the United States of America. However, the principle 
was rejected by most states, including the hosts nation of its headquarters, that of the United 
States.72 This agreement states that diplomats: 
“Shall, whether residing inside or outside the headquarters district, be entitled in the 
territory of the United States to the same privileges and immunities, subject to 
corresponding conditions and obligations, as it accords to diplomatic envoys accredited 
 
4. The immunity of a diplomatic agent from the jurisdiction of the receiving State does not exempt him 
from the jurisdiction of the sending State.” 
69 Article 32 of the Vienna Convention states that: 
“The immunity from jurisdiction of diplomatic agents and of persons enjoying immunity under Article 37 may 
be waived by the sending state; (2) waiver must always be expressed; (3) the initiation of proceedings by a 
diplomatic agent or by a person enjoying immunity from jurisdiction under Article 37 shall preclude him from 
invoking immunity from jurisdiction in respect of any counterclaim directly connected with the principal 
claim; (4) waiver of immunity from jurisdiction in respect of civil or administrative proceedings shall not be 
held to imply waiver of immunity in respect of execution of judgement, for which a separate waiver shall be 
necessary.” 
70  Aniche op cit n63 at  6, see also S Goossens 2011. Diplomatic immunity: An argument for re-evaluation. LLM 
(University of KwaZulu-Natal) (2011) 32-36. 
71 Article 4 (11) Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations (1946). 
72 Article V section 15(1-4) of the United Nations and United States of America Agreement regarding the 
Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success, 26 June 1947. 
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to it. In the case of Members whose governments are not recognized by the United 
States, such privileges and immunities need be extended to such representatives, or 
persons on the staffs of such representatives, only within the headquarters district, at 
their residences and offices outside the district, in transit between the district and such 
residences and offices, and in transit on official business to or from foreign countries.”73 
Therefore, it is upon the above principle and rules that officials employed by international 
organisations are accorded immunity. However, the immunity accorded to them differs. For 
instance, while high-ranking officials of UNSC generals enjoy absolute immunity, others only 
enjoy protection in so far as it relates to their official duty.   
In 2015, this principle was implemented during the African Union meeting held in South 
Africa. It was further used as a defence where the question of the arrest and surrender of the 
former president of Sudan was brought before the domestic court of South Africa in the case 
of South African Litigation Centre v the Minister of Justice and Development.74 It was a 
debatable decision because it only focused on the immunity accorded to agents and other state 
officials. However the case said little in relation to immunity accorded to “head of state,” 
thereby failing to answer the question of whether immunity applied to heads of state.75 In the 
next chapter of this research, this decision will be discussed in more detail. 
While diplomatic immunity is well-defined in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 
1961, the immunity of serving heads of state and other senior state officials remains uncertain.76 
The next section of this chapter will address the immunity of senior state officials. 
d) Senior State Officials  
 
In terms of customary international law, minister of foreign affairs, heads of government and 
states enjoy immunity, primarily for official purposes and functions, and serves to protect them 
from proceedings before foreign domestic courts.77 In other words, no prosecutions will ensue 
 
73 Ibid. 
74 Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development v Southern African Litigation Centre (867/15) [2016] 
ZASCA 17 and Southern Africa Litigation Centre v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 
(27740/2015) [2015] ZAGPPHC 402. 
75 Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development supra and Southern Africa Litigation Centre v Minister of 
Justice and Constitutional Development supra. 
76 Needham op cit n8 at 224. 
77 S Zappalo ‘Do heads of state in office enjoy immunity from jurisdiction for international crimes?’ (2001) 12 
EJIL 595 at 597. Ghadafi case before the French cour de cassation.  
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for doing their jobs.78 Immunity ensures smooth international relations between states and that 
the process of communication is effective.  
e) Types of immunity for senior state officials 
There are two kinds of immunities under international law that are recognised for senior state 
officials, namely, “functional immunity (ratione materiae)” and “personal immunity (ratione 
personae).” These kinds of immunity are conferred on officials because of their office or status 
of the officials. These types of immunities will now be discussed in further detail. 
 
i. Functional Immunity (Immunity Ratione Materiae) 
 
Functional immunity is a principle that enables an office bearer of a state to perform his or her 
duty without the fear of prosecution. This type of immunity extends to acts which are carried 
out by an official acting in an official capacity or on behalf of the state.79 Further, there is an 
expectation and assumption that considers every state official’s act as a respective act of the 
state, and contributes to the existence of “immunity ratione materiae.” In the Prosecutor v. 
Tihomir Blaškić case,80 this rule was confirmed and it was held that since state officials are 
state instruments, their actions should be credited to the state and they should not be punished 
for it. This rule is in terms of customary international law and has been in practice since the 
18th century.81 Thus, actions of state officials  cannot be attributed to officials privately. Further, 
officials cannot be held responsible for a decision made on behalf of the state.  
 
It could also be said that functional immunity is derived from the principle of sovereign equality 
and in terms of this principle “one sovereign state cannot, in its own court of law, call into 
question the acts of another. This is an obligation that states have towards each other.”82 This 
principle is reinforced by the notion of equality that since states are equal, interference in the 
internal matters of other state is not allowed. Does this imply that immunity ratione materiae 
or functional immunity promotes impunity or violations of international crimes?  
 
 
78 D Akande and S Shah ‘Immunities of state official, international crimes and foreign domestic courts’ (2011) 21 
Europ J Int’l L 818. 
79 Needham op cit n8 at 224.  
80 ‘Prosecutor v Tihomir Blaskic (Trial judgement IT-95-14-T) International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY)’, 3 March 2000, available at https://www reworld [Accessed on 7April 2020]. 
81 DAkande and Shah op cit n78 at 827, See also Prosecutor v. Blaškić supra para 38. 
82 Needham op cit n8 at 224. 
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This question could be answered by stating that immunity does not cover international crimes. 
Any head of state or state official found responsible for an international crime cannot invoke 
or rely on immunity from national or international jurisdictions even where the state official 
was carrying out an official duty or performing an official function. The reason for this 
argument is because a state official’s acts cannot amount to international crimes or a violation 
of jus cogens and these international norms may never be considered as official acts or 
functions. In addition, states that are caught up in such controversies, are considered to have 
stepped outside their sphere of sovereignty, thereby implicitly waiving their rights to 
immunity.83 For example, in the case of Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic, it was pointed out that: 
“those responsible for [international crimes] cannot invoke immunity from national or 
international jurisdiction even if they perpetrated such crimes while acting in their official 
capacity .... Similarly, other classes of persons ... although acting as State organs, may be held 
personally accountable for their wrongdoing.”84 Therefore, a state cannot claim violation of jus 
cogens for sovereign immunity.85 However, the perpetrator of international crimes that acts or 
benefits from the national measure may, nevertheless, still be held criminally responsible for 
torture by both domestic and international tribunals.86  
 
This argument held in Blaskic, was dispensed by some judges in the case of Pinochet where it 
was further stated that the idea of using state functions or official acts as a defence for violation 
of international crimes, was rejected. This statement is in line with the rejected defence raised 
in the Nuremberg Tribunal. However, it was confirmed that under international law, the head 
of state is guaranteed functional immunity.87 
 
ii. Personal Immunity (Immunity Ratione Personae) 
 
Personal immunity or “immunity ratione personae” is a rule in terms of international law that 
is attached to a particular office.  This type of immunity applies to serving heads of state, heads 
of government, and diplomats. Thus, this principle is dependant on the importance of position 
held.88 In practice the rule is that every act performed by state or senior officials is inviolable. 
 
83 Akande and Shah op cit n78 at 829.   
84 Prosecutor v Tihomir Blaskic supra. 
85 TWeatherall ‘Jus cogens and sovereign immunity: Reconciling divergence in contemporary jurisprudence’ 
(2015) 46 Geo J Int’l L 1181-2.  
86 Ibid. 
87 Akande and Shah op cit n78 at 832. 
88 Akande and Shah op cit n78 at 820. 
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Therefore, state officials that this principle of immunity applies to are exempt from foreign 
criminal or civil jurisdictions for any act performed.89 The benefit of this type of immunity is 
that it allows heads of state or senior officials to travel freely and conduct their roles without 
fear of prosecution.90  
 
However, it should be noted that in terms of the Arrest Warrant91 case, the principle of personal 
immunity was guaranteed to other officials, such as the diplomatic and consular agents, high-
ranking official in a state, such as the head of state, head of government and Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, who will enjoy immunities from jurisdiction in other states, both civil and 
criminal. 
 
The Court described the official as an individual that occupies a high-ranking office, and this 
extends to ministers of foreign affairs.92 The reason why such a principle is extended to 
ministers of foreign affairs, is because the official occupies a high-ranking position. 
Furthermore, such minister plays a vital role that requires immunity.  
 
Personal immunity is absolute and applies to any judicial process in a foreign state pertaining 
to any form of conduct. This could include acts done from the moment the official occupies 
office and acts committed during their term of office. The crucial aspect of immunity in this 
context is that the focus is not on the type of act committed by the official, but the position the 
official holds. Immunity is there to enable the official to perform their duties without fear of 
interference or fear of prosecution and ceases to exist once the official vacates office.93 In other 
words, any crimes committed while in office can still be prosecuted. The case of Pinochet94 
demonstrates this point well. Pinochet enjoyed both functional and personal immunity during 
his term of office. This immunity (personal) was absolute during his tenure as president but 
ceased to exist when his term ended.95 However functional immunity only protected him from 
acts performed during his official capacity.96 It must be noted that recognising a head of state 
 
89 Arrest Warrant supra para 5; see also Article 29 and 32 of the United Nations Conventions on Special Missions 
1969. 
90 Ibid; see also the Arrest Warrant case supra para 55. 
91 Arrest Warrant supra paras 54-55. 
92 Needham op cit n8 at 224, see also Arrest Warrant supra para 51. 
93 VN Opara ‘Sovereign & Diplomatic Immunity as Customary International Law: Beyond R. v. Bow Street 
Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate & Others, Ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte’ (2003) 21 Wisc Int’l L J 255 at 256. 
94 Pinochet supra para 112-3. 
95 Pinochet supra para 112. 
96 Pinochet supra para 119. 
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(immunity ratione personae) has been controversial in nature both before international and 
foreign domestic courts. The reasons for such controversies are mainly centred on the following 
view that in terms of the customary international law position, a head of state is protected by 
both functional and personal immunity which occur simultaneously. 
 
Thus, sitting heads of state are immune from all forms of prosecution irrespective of the crimes 
alleged and this covers international crime committed. However, this principle ceases to apply 
once the official leaves office. Functional immunity covers those acts done in an official 
capacity but does not cease when the official’s term in office expires. This point is 
demonstrated in the Pinochet case where the head of state enjoys both functional and personal 
immunity. This aspect of the principle of immunity will be discussed in more detail in chapters 
3 and 4. 
 
In drawing a conclusion on the status of immunity under customary international law, it could 
be argued that under international law, heads of state and senior state officials are guaranteed 
both personal and functional immunity. The Vienna Convention guarantees diplomatic 
immunity under Article 2997 and Article 31, and stipulates that officials will be immune from 
receiving state’s jurisdiction in the event of criminal prosecutions.98 However, upon closer 
perusal of Article 39(1& 2), immunity ceases to exist on termination of position. Acts 
performed during an official’s term of office remains intact.99 Perhaps it could be argued that 
immunity is not in fact enjoyed. Further, in light of worldwide atrocities, it is arguable that 
states are more likely to cede immunity to ensure prosecutions. However, this does not imply 
that yielding immunity to the officials for both criminal and civil prosecution has become a 
rule of customary international law. While the ICJ in the Arrest warrant100 case rejected a 
 
97 Article 29 states that: 
“The person of a diplomatic agent shall be inviolable. He shall not be liable to any form of arrest or 
detention. The receiving State shall treat him with due respect and shall take all appropriate steps to 
prevent any attack on his person, freedom or dignity.” 
98 Article 31 of Vienna Convention supra. 
99 Article 39 (1-2) of the Vienna convention supra. 
“1.Every person entitled to privileges and immunities shall enjoy them from the moment he enters the 
territory of the receiving State on proceeding to take up his post or, if already in its territory, from the 
moment when his appointment is notified to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs or such other ministry as 
may be agreed. 
 2.When the functions of a person enjoying privileges and immunities have come to an end, such 
privileges and immunities shall normally cease at the moment when he leaves the country, or on expiry 
of a reasonable period in which to do so, but shall subsist until that time, even in case of armed conflict. 
However, with respect to acts performed by such a person in the exercise of his functions as a member 
of the mission, immunity shall continue to subsist.” 
100 Arrest Warrant supra. 
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contention that international law did not recognise immunity, it did acknowledge that such 
immunity was restricted it cases involving serious violations of the laws involving armed 
conflict. The current position appears to accept that sitting heads of state would enjoy 
immunity, and this continues, except when such immunity is waived by the UNSC.  
 
2.5 Current Customary International Law Status of Immunity 
 
Having discussed the different categories of immunity guaranteed to state officials under 
customary international law, it is now necessary to consider the status of personal immunity 
under foreign and domestic courts, to determine if such officials still enjoy such immunity. 
 
a)  Immunity Before Domestic Courts 
 
The principle of immunity afforded to a head of state before a domestic court differs from state 
to state and depends on a country’s national laws. Therefore, even if customary international 
law provides immunity, the state still has the discretion to limit or renounce such immunity. 
One such country that provides complete immunity to a sitting head of state is that of Sudan. 
In terms of Article 60(1) of the Interim Constitution of Sudan (2005), “the President of the 
Republic and the First Vice President is entitled to immunity before any domestic court from 
any legal proceedings and shall not be charged or sued in any court of law during their tenure 
of office.”101 
 
i. Personal Immunity of Sitting Senior Officials or Heads of State before Foreign 
Domestic Courts  
 
Universal jurisdiction has provided domestic courts with the ability to undertake prosecution 
of serious international offences in a representative capacity on behalf of the international 
community. The reason for this is threefold. First, other states may not have an interest in the 
matter. Second, other states may not be able to exercise jurisdiction based on traditional 
doctrine and last, it is in the interests of the international community that prosecutions be 
undertaken. However, it needs to noted that immunity of heads of state or senior officials before 
foreign domestic courts is different to that of the state of origin. Prosecutions in foreign states 
are governed by the principles of international law as opposed to domestic law. Cases that deals 
 
101 The Interim Constitution of Sudan (2005). 
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with prosecution in foreign domestic states (or under international law) is that of Pinochet102 




The first case to examine the principle of immunity accorded to high ranking state officials was 
that of Pinochet.104  This case denied a head of state immunity on the basis that immunity does 
not protect perpetrators of international crimes from being prosecuted for violating 
international law.105 
 
In September 1973, General Augusto Pinochet, then Commander-in-Chief of the Chilean army, 
led a military coup to seize control of the country from President Salvador Allende. During 
Pinochet’s subsequent 17 years in office as the president, his regime allegedly committed 
numerous human rights violations, including curtailing civil liberties, as well as perpetrating 
acts of torture and murder. He eventually stepped down in 1990 after losing in the first 
democratic election. After years of investigating his official actions, at the request of a Spanish 
court, an arrest warrant was issued in 1998, which alleged that Pinochet was responsible for 
the deaths of countless Chilean citizens, between 11Th September 1973 and 31 December 1983– 
during his tenure as president.106 This occurred despite the fact that the new regime in Chile 
had granted Pinochet amnesty for the crimes he had committed whilst in power.107 In this case, 
Spain applied for the extradition108 of Pinochet for the crimes between January 1976 and 
December 1992, which comprised of “murder, torture, disappearance, illegal detention and 
forcible transfer.” 
 
A judicial review application was made to the Divisional Court seeking to quash the decision 
to issue the warrant. However, the court held that Pinochet was entitled to immunity as a former 
head of state. On appeal, six out of seven judges held that Pinochet had no immunity.109 This 
was because international crimes were already prohibited in terms of international law and 
 
102 Pinochet supra. 
103 Arrest Warrant supra. 
104 Pinochet supra para 56. 
105 Opara op cit (n93) 255. 
106 Pinochet supra para 56; See also Needham op cit n8 at 227. 
107 Pinochet supra para 57. 
108 In terms of Section 8(1)(b) of the 1989 Extradition Act; A Bianchi ‘Immunity versus human rights: The 
Pinochet case’ (1999) 10(2) EJIL 237 at 243. 
109 Pinochet supra para 63-5.  
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since the conduct in question amounted to international crimes, they could not be deemed to 
be official acts. Therefore, he could not be protected in terms of functional immunity.110 
Although the case focus is on functional immunity, the relevance of this case for this research 
is that it does indicate what form of immunity a head of state charged with violating 
international law will be entitled to claim for. 
 
Lord Goff in the same judgement provided an opposing view suggesting that the possibility of 
an offence cannot be ignored, and therefore the only immunity applicable will be that of 
personal immunity: “That the reason provided for disregarding functional immunity did not 
affect personal immunity of senior official.”111  
 
Arrest Warrant Case112 
 
The ICJ in the Arrest Warrant113case later reaffirmed full immunity from criminal jurisdiction 
of an incumbent head of state. In this case, a warrant of arrest was issued by a Belgian judge 
against the then Congolese foreign minister, alleging grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions114 and various other protocols including crimes against humanity or war.115 
The actions of the Minister of Foreign Affairs were said to have led to the death of hundreds 
of the Tutsi population in the DRC, as a result of hate speech inciting violence.116 However, 
the Congo government alleged that this action breached the immunity of the DRC.117 Despite 
the fact that at the time Yerodia was no longer Minister of Foreign Affairs within the meaning 
of the term “the Optional Clause Declarations of the Parties” the Court accordingly lacked 
jurisdiction in this case".118 The Court however, made findings in terms of the international 
law, stating that the immunity of the official must be respected because of the office he holds 
as state representative.119 In its reasoning, the Court compared the status and functions of 
president with that of the minister in charge of external affairs. Thus, the ministers required the 
 
110 Pinochet supra at 114-115 (per Lord Wilkinson), at 151-152 (per Lord Hope) at 189-190 (per Lord Phillip). 
111 Pinochet supra para 168. 
112 Arrest Warrant supra. 
113 Arrest Warrant supra paras 29-32.  
114 Art. 50 Geneva Conventions. 
115 Arrest Warrant supra paras 13 -21. 
116 Arrest Warrant supra paras 18-19. 
117 Arrest Warrant supra para 50. 
118 Wirth op cit n27 at 881-2. See also Arrest Warrant supra paras 23-28 & 51. 
119 Knuchel op cit n6 at 157, see also Arrest Warrant supra para 55.   
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same immunity, because of the rationale of them being able to discharge their functions.120 
However, the Court qualified this statement by stating that: 
 
“The immunities enjoyed under international law do not represent a bar to criminal 
prosecution in certain circumstances. An incumbent or former Minister for Foreign 
Affairs may be subject to criminal proceedings before certain international criminal 
courts, where the court have jurisdiction.”121 
 
The judgment from these cases which were both from a domestic court demonstrates that both 
heads of state and other senior state officials enjoy immunity before international courts, 
despite the crimes with which they are charged. However, the cases highlighted that certain 
circumstances do not present a bar to prosecution. These circumstances could encompass the 
following: 
• where the incumbent or former minister does not enjoy criminal immunity under 
international law in their own country 
• if the state the individual represents waives immunity 
• when the incumbent or former minister’s term of office has come to an end or when the 
individual vacates the office. 
 
 Thus, the private acts committed while in office and prior and subsequent to being in office, 
would be prosecuted. Fourth, immunity may not be applicable before all international tribunals 
that have jurisdiction.122 Examples of such courts are the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), 
which was established pursuant to Security Council resolutions under Chapter VI1 of the 
United Nations Charter, and the ICC. It is in situations such as this that the individual becomes 
subject to criminal proceedings.123 
 
What was noteworthy about the Court’s finding was that it clearly differentiated between 
functional immunity and procedural immunity as being distinct concepts. Criminal liability is 
a question of substantive law whereas jurisdictional immunity is procedural in nature.124 
 
120 Knuchel op cit n6, see also Arrest Warrant supra para 53-55, See also Wirth op cit n27 at 879. 
121 Arrest Warrant supra para 61. 
122 Arrest Warrant supra para 62-64, See also Wirth op cit27 at 879. 
123 Weatherall op cit n85 at 1160, 
124 Arrest Warrant supra paras 25 and 60. 
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There is both personal and functional immunity as indicated above for a limited time in certain 
instances. However, is such immunity legitimate? On the one hand states may take the position 
of non-intervention in the affairs of other states, but this cannot bar the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction under conventional international law. This jurisdiction concerns acts of genocide, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes regardless of the nationality of the offender, 
nationality of the victim and where the crime was committed. Because these crimes are 
recognised as jus cogens which enjoys preferential status in international law, it is possible that 
it may invalidate all other rules pertaining to head of state immunity. However, this is not 
supported by the ICJ or most national courts. For example, according to the Arrest Warrantcase 
state sovereignty still requires that universal jurisdiction is limited through complementary and 
immunity principles. Therefore, to exercise universal jurisdiction the conditions under which 
it can be exercised, and its obstacles must be considered, for instance, the presence of the 
accused in the territory. 
The personal immunity of a senior official is not determined by their official capacity. The 
ICTY125 endorsed this same view, holding that officials charged with discharge of international 
crimes cannot rely on immunity as a defence both under international and national jurisdiction. 
This rule will apply regardless of whether the crimes were perpetrated while acting within the 
official capacity.126  
Thus, state officials are protected and their immunity can only be removed or lifted if the state 
in question waives this immunity. The Arrest Warrant case demonstrated the circumstances 
under which a state official is protected in terms of procedural immunity (personal immunity) 
and the circumstances under which such officials are subjected to foreign state domestic 
jurisdiction.127 In that case, Belgium argued that according to the Rome Statute and the 
Nuremburg Charter, incumbent ministers of foreign affairs cannot rely on immunity as a 
defence in relation to certain serious crimes. In addition to citing domestic legislation and 
judicial decisions, the Court also noted that in terms of the Nuremburg Charter Article 7, courts 
are not allowed to conclude that “an exception exists under customary international law.”128 
 
b) Limitations of Personal Immunity Under Treaty Obligations 
 
 
125 See Knuchel op cit n6 at 158 footnote 45, Prosecutor v. Blaikie (Case No. IT-95-14), Appeals Chamber, 
‘Judgment on the Request of the Republic of Croatia for the Review of the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 18  
July 1997’, 41 (29 October 1997). 
126 Arrest Warrant supra paras 24 and 58; Knuchel op cit n6 at 158. 
127 Arrest Warrant supra para 58. 
128 Arrest Warrant supra para 98. 
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In terms of customary international law, it would appear that where international crimes have 
been committed, there is a duty to prosecute and this duty applies under treaty law. It also 
places a limitation on personal immunity for the purpose of prosecution.129 This position was 
strengthened after World War II by means of introduction of various human rights conventions 
to prevent further such atrocities. These included the Convention on Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.130 In terms of this convention, “Persons committing 
genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article III shall be punished, whether they are 
constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals.”131 
 
The Pinochet case also set a precedent in this regard. The former president of Chile was accused 
of crimes such as “torture, hostage-taking, and conspiracy to commit crimes at various times” 
between January 1976 and December 1992.132 The main reason was that such acts violated 
international law.133 The Court also had to consider whether the crime of torture was already a 
crime as of 1982. It held that in terms of customary international law, the crime of torture was 
already considered a crime.134 Therefore, the offender would be held liable. The Court also 
added that, as of 1982, not only was torture a crime in terms of international customary law but 
that irrespective of a person’s nationality, countries have jurisdiction to prosecute for crimes 
committed against humanity.135  
 
With regards to individual criminal responsibility, treaties under international law allow states 
to hold officials accountable. Further, “states parties are either competent or obliged to 
prosecute or extradite responsible individuals regardless of them being state officials through 
means of prosecution or extradition.” The International Court of Justice (ICJ)136 in this regard 
identified four limits to personal immunity which are discussed in detail below:  
First, personal immunity can be limited if the “state decides to subjugate criminal proceeding 
and criminal prosecution.”137 The second limitation on personal immunity comes from the 
general principle under which immunities exist,138 and which is for the benefit of the state and 
 
129 American Bar Association ‘Limitation of sovereign immunity’ (1960) 5(1) Int’l & Compar L Bull 28–32.   
130 UN General Assembly Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide supra.  
131 Art. 4. 
132 M Davis (ed) Pinochet Case: Origins, progress and implications (2000) 3. 
133 Pinochet supra para 926; see also Davis ibid. 
134 Pinochet supra para 926-9, 931-3. 
135 Pinochet supra paras 926-9.  
136 The Arrest Warrant case supra para 61. 
137 Pinochet supra at para 61 as cited in Weatherall op cit n85 at 1152 at 1160. 
138 Jones v The United Kingdom supra. At para 188 the Court explained that; 
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not the individual.139 This same rule was held in the Pinochet case, that the basis upon which 
the immunity of Pinochet was observed was based on the obligation towards the state of Chile 
and not Pinochet as an individual.140 Thus, the state can then limit such immunity through a 
waiver, thereby giving foreign court’s jurisdiction over the official in question.141  
 
The third limitation is when a tribunal or the enabling statute of such tribunal can be used to 
determine the limitation of personal immunity. Therefore, if charges are brought before the 
ICC for instance, there are various factors that will be considered to determine the limitation 
of personal immunity.142 The provision that enables such limitation is derived from Article 7 
of the International Military Tribunal.143 In terms of this provision, immunity as a defence or 
any other type of immunity is removed from an accused official and the official will be held 
personally responsible for their actions.144 
 
The fourth limitation of personal immunity is when the official vacates his office, the immunity 
accorded to him ceases to exist. This rule is universally accepted under international law.145 
The treatment of personal immunity by Spain’s National Court (Audiencia Nacional) in Madrid 
offers a good illustration of this limit in practice at the domestic level. Thus, 
 
 “in criminal proceedings relating to crimes against humanity and violations of the 
United Nations Convention against Torture (CAT), Pinochet’s immunity was removed 
because he was the former head of state to Chile but the Court during that same period 
acknowledged the immunity of Fidel Castro as he was currently the incumbent Head of 
State of Cuba.”146  
 
 
 Sovereign immunity is a concept of international law, developed out of the principle par in parem non 
habet imperium, by virtue of which one State shall not be subject to the jurisdiction of another State. The 
grant of sovereign immunity to a State in civil proceedings pursues the legitimate aim of complying with 
international law to promote comity and good relations between States through the respect of another 
State’s sovereignty  
139 R v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis, Ex Parte Pinochet, [1999] UKHL 17 (LJ Browne Wilkinson) 
[R v Commissioner] 8 as cited in Weatherall op cit n 1152 at 1160. 
140 Ibid.  
141 Weatherall, op cit n85 at 1160. 
142 Arrest Warrant case supra para 61, see also Weatherall op cit n85,  at 1160. 
143 Charter of the International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg Charter) 1945, art 7. 
144 Article 7 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg Charter), stipulate that: “the official 
position of defendant whether head of state or responsible official in government shall not be considered as 
freeing them from responsibility or mitigation punishment.”  
145 Arrest Warrant case supra para 61. 
146 Pinochet supra para 926. 
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This point was also demonstrated in the Arrest Warrant case. Here the ICJ made a temporal 
limitation to immunity.147 Therefore, once an individual ceases to hold office, personal 
immunity can be limited. However, “official acts” may still be entitled to the protection of 
functional immunity, although this type of immunity is not the focus of this research.148 
 
2.6 Immunity before International Criminal Tribunals 
 
a)  International Criminal Tribunal for The Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and Hybrid Court 
 
It is questionable whether immunity before international tribunals will be applicable. While 
some theorists have argued that the principle of sovereignty and equality of states demands that 
immunity continue to be recognised, others are of the view that whether it exists before a 
tribunal will depend on the grounds and manner that the tribunal has been established.149 
For instance, in the ICTY and ICTR situations, both have provisions that bar immunity for the 
purpose of prosecutions. Article 6(2) and 7(2) of ICTY stipulates that: 
 
 “The official position of any accused person, whether as Head of State or Government 
or as a responsible Government official, shall not relieve such person of criminal 
responsibility nor mitigate punishment.” 
 
The manner in which tribunals developed, either through treaties or through UNSC resolutions 
will determine whether immunity is enjoyed, since it will ultimately determine the scope of 
jurisdiction. For example, Chapter VII of the UN Charter established from the ICTY and ICTR 
and from the statute, that immunity is barred for the purpose of the tribunal’s jurisdiction. It is 
now necessary to briefly consider these tribunals. 
 
b) International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)  
 
The ad hoc tribunals were tribunals set up by the Security Council in 1993 through150 
Resolution 827 and were mandated to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of 
 
147 Arrest warrant supra para 61. 
148 Page 9: R v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and Others, Ex Parte Pinochet, [1999] UKHL 17 (LJ 
Browne Wilkinson) [R v Commissioner]. 
149 P Gaeta ‘Does President Al-Bashir enjoy immunity from arrest?’ (2009) 7(2) J Int’l Crim Jus 315 at 321. 
150 WA Schabas Introduction to International Criminal Court (2001) 13.   
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international humanitarian law that took place in 1991 in Yugoslavia.151 In Prosecutor v. 
Slobodan Milosevic152  the head of state was charged with the crimes of genocide, crimes 
against humanity and war crimes committed. Although he attempted to raise a defence of 
immunity, it was rejected on the basis of Articles 7(1) and 7(2) of the ICTY Statute, which 
stated that immunity is removed on the basis that the provision of immunity had attained 
customary international law status. In this case, the UN document S/RES/827 points out that: 
 
“A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and 
abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in 
Articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute, shall be individually responsible for the 
crime. The official position of any accused person, whether as Head of State or 
Government or as a responsible Government official, shall not relieve such 
person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment.”153 
 
In Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic it was held that the scope of powers vested in the UNSC in terms 
of Article 41 was so wide that the UNSC had discretion in deciding which method to employ 
to ensure maintenance of peace and security. Therefore, the UNSC could establish a body to 
deal with war crime violations. The Court held that it did have jurisdiction to hear the matter 
and Article 7(2) does not contradict established international law.154 
 
A few years later, the ICTR was established on the basis of ICTR Resolution 955. This 
resolution also made immunity unavailable by:  
 
“...prosecuting persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations of 
international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda and Rwandan 
citizens responsible for genocide and other such violations committed in the territory 
of neighbouring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994.”155 
 
151 Schabas op cit n150 at 11.  
152 ‘Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic (Decision on Interlocutory Appeal on Kosta Bulatovic Contempt 
Proceedings)’ (29 August 2005), available at:  https://www refworld.org/ 
cases,ICTY,47fdfb5a0.html  [Accessed 20 June 2020]. 
153 Article 7(1 and 2) of the ‘Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for 
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia 
since 1991, U.N. Doc. S/25704 at 36, annex (1993) and S/25704/Add.1 (1993), adopted by Security Council 
on 25 May 1993, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993). 
154 Ibid para 26 and 27. 




c) Hybrid Courts. 
 
The Charles Taylor156 case is an example of a case from a hybrid court, known as the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL). The pretrial Chamber requested his prosecution, charging him 
with violations of Article 3 of the Geneva Convention and Additional Protocol II as well as 
crimes against humanity and other violations of international humanitarian law. These included 
abduction and child labour.157 A motion was placed to quash the indictment brought by the 
prosecution on the basis that the indictment violated the principle of immunity as set out in 
Article 2(1) of the United Nations Charter and was contrary to customary international law. To 
reinforce this point, the defence made reference to the Arrest Warrant case, stating that the 
reason for immunity was because the arrest of such an individual while abroad would 
jeopardise the conduct of international affairs of the state for which the person acts as an 
official. Thus, the state official immunity (head of state, minister of foreign affairs) was 
inviolable.158 In addition, it was argued that the Court was not established by VII of UNSC and 
lacked jurisdiction to try him as head of state. 
 
In Taylor,159  in terms of international law, the Court held that immunity will not apply as a 
defence before an international tribunal. As already stated, this was similar to the view 
confirmed in the Arrest Warrant case and the cases of the ICTY, ICTR and ICC.  This was 
because the special court was international in nature.  Article 39 and Article 41 were the basis 
upon which the SC was empowered to initiate the establishment of a special court by agreement 
with Sierra Leone.160 Further, such court will be binding if there is an agreement between the 
country concerned and the UN.161 The Court further stated that quashing the indictment on the 
basis that the accused person had held personal immunity at the time of the indictment would 
be futile, since it would only have the effect of requiring the prosecutor to issue a fresh 
indictment against Charles Taylor, who as a former head of state was, at the time of the 
 
156 ‘Prosecutor v Charles Ghankay Taylor (Judgement Summary)’, SCSL-03-1-T, Special Court for Sierra 
Leone, 26 April 2012, available at: https://www refworld.org/cases,SCSL,4f9a4c762.html  [accessed 22 July 
2020]. 
157 Taylor supra paras 32-59. 
158 Taylor supra para 3. 
159 ‘Special Court for Sierra Leone, Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction, 31 
May 2004’ para 37. 
160 Ibid.  
161 Taylor supra para 38. 
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decision, susceptible to the Court’s jurisdiction.162 If there is no UNSC support, then the SCSL 
and its statute are purely treaty based and is only binding on signatory states. 
 
The argument therefore exists that Taylor’s case does not amount to precedent indicating that 
immunity of a head of state can be removed before an international tribunal. This is because 
the SCSL was not properly established in terms of Chapter VII of SC therefore had no authority 
and if there was no authority then the SCSL does not have jurisdiction over the issue. Further, 
it does not appear as if Resolution 1315 of the UNSC used powers available under VII when 
developing the SCSL. In addition, the preamble of the resolution requests states to assist, it 
does not demand they do so. If the SCSL does not have the backing of the UNSC as the ICTY 
and ICTR did, then such tribunal and its statute remain treaty-based organisation. Thus, the 
implication of this is that the tribunal and it statute only binds treaty signatories, i.e. UN as an 
organisation and not actual individual members. 
The next tribunal that will be discussed, although of more recent origin, is that of the African 
Court of Justice and Human Rights (ACJHR). Although not yet in force, this tribunal was 
founded in 2004 and is important because it became a tool used to further promote the decision 
to boycott the ICC by the members of the African Union.  
 
d) African Court of Justice and Human Rights (ACJHR). 
 
The relationship between the African states and the ICC was intensified with the arrest warrant 
issued against Al-Bashir. In 2009, the Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC) issued an arrest warrant against 
Al-Bashir for crimes against humanity and war crimes. The AU criticised the warrant and stated 
that the decision to issue an arrest warrant against the former president of Sudan would 
jeopardise the peace process. The African Union then requested the UN Security Council in 
terms of Article 16 of the Rome Statute to defer the indictment against Al-Bashir.163 However, 
the UNSC failed to respond to their request of a deferral and continued with its mission to bring 
Al-Bashir to trial. It is arguable that this refusal to react to the AU’s request that soured the 
relations between the African Union and the ICC. As a result, in 2009 at the 13th annual summit 
 
162 Taylor supra para 59. 
163 ‘Decision on the Meeting of African States Parties to Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’ (AU 
Assembly /13(XIII)) (1-3 July 2009) para 5.   
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of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the AU urged all its member states to 
abide by the decision of the African Union, not to cooperate with the ICC.164 
 
The relationship further deteriorated after the African Union’s demand for the deferral of the 
case against the current Kenyan president Uhuru Kenyatta and his deputy William Ruto was 
refused. All these subsequent events between the AU and the ICC, convinced African leaders 
to replace the ICC with a court of their own creation. Therefore, in the quest to address the 
violation of international law and serious crime in 2014 in Malabo, the AU adopted a protocol 
that extends jurisdiction of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights.165  
 
However, the establishment of such a proposed court is not without its problems.  It has been 
argued that the reason for establishing the African Court on Human and People’s Rights has 
nothing to do with the Al-Bashir conflict, but in fact pre-dates the African Union-ICC conflict. 
Initially, the idea to establish the court was initiated by legal experts before any disputes arose 
, back in 2006, in the case of Hissene Habre.166 A committee of African jurists were mandated 
to examine the options that would be available for a trial as well as provide concrete 
recommendations on how such issues can be dealt with in the future. Therefore, it is argued 
that one of the recommendations made was to grant the African court the jurisdiction to 
prosecute criminal cases and for the African union to lead the process involved in establishing 
such court.167 
 
The second reason advanced for the proposed establishment of the African Court of Justice had 
to do with the principle of universal jurisdiction and the warrant of arrest for Al-Bashir. In fact, 
it was argued that the indictment of a African high-ranking official by a European court was 
seen by the African Union as an abuse of the principle of universal jurisdiction. As a result, the 
AU adopted a decision requesting the commission, in consultation with the African 
Commission on Human and People’s Rights and the African Court on Human and People’s 
Rights to examine the implication of extending its criminal jurisdiction.168 
 
 
164 Ibid.   
165 Ibid.    
166 ‘Decision on the Hisshne Habre Case and the African Union’ (Doc. Assembly/AU/8 (VI)) Add. 9, 
(Assembly/AU/Dec.103 (VI)), para 2. 
167 ZB Abebe ‘The African Court with a criminal jurisdiction and the ICC: A case for overlapping jurisdiction’  
(2017) 25(3) Afr J Int’l & Compar L 418 at 420. 
168 Abebe op cit n167 at 421, African Court on Human and People’s Rights 1998. 
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The third reason advanced for the proposed establishment of the African Court of Justice relates 
to Article 25(5) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. The Article 
requires “the trial of perpetrators of unconstitutional change of government before the 
competent court” of the Union and it is argued that the aim of giving effect to this provision, 
was so that the jurisdiction of the court could be expanded to include the crime along with other 
international crimes.169  
 
Despite all these arguments, the reason for establishing the African court seems to have 
gained momentum only during the time when the relationship between the African 
Union and the ICC soured. Furthermore, “Article 46Abis” of the Amendment protocol 
also seems to be the crux of the issue regarding the establishment of this court, or 
alternatively, extending the criminal jurisdiction of the court. The amendment protocol 
in terms of Article 46bis reads as follow: “No charges shall be commenced or continued 
before the Court against any serving AU Head of State or Government, or anybody 
acting or entitled to act in such capacity, or other senior state officials based on their 
functions, during their tenure of office.” 
 
This provision has been criticised, not only because it supports the establishment of the 
proposed African court but because it also confers personal immunity and makes such 
immunity absolute. Furthermore, this principle of immunity in terms of this article, remains 
vague with regards to its beneficiaries and is open to include all state officials.170 
 
e)  International Criminal Court (ICC) 
 
The last type of court, which is the central focus of the discussion of this dissertation, is the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) which is also an international tribunal, created for “the 
prosecution of persons responsible for the violation of crimes of genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression.”171 The Court was created in terms of the 
Rome Statute, the same Statute that set down the rules that govern the Court’s jurisdiction over 
crimes committed either within the territory of a state party or by another of the state parties. 
Similar arguments could be made, such that heads of state and senior state officials may not 
 
169 ‘Decision on the Hisshne Habre Case and the African Union’ supra para. 2. 
170 Abebe op cit n167 at 421 




necessarily enjoy personal or functional immunity under this Court. These arguments will be 
further discussed in Chapter 3 and analysed in Chapter four. 
However, for the purpose of this chapter, the following factors with regards to the Court must 
be noted.  This statute contains an article that removes immunity accorded to state officials 
and in terms of Article 27(2) a country loses its sovereign immunity by signing the Rome 
Statute. 
 
“Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of a 
person, whether under national or international law, shall not bar the Court from 
exercising its jurisdiction over such a person.”172 
 
 However, this is not the case for non-state parties, to implement such restriction in terms of 
Article 98(1), the article requires that the official’s state waive the official’s immunity or 
covering.  
The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance which would 
require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under 
international law with respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a person or 
property of a third State, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of that third 
State for the waiver of the immunity. 
 
However, the tensions between the different articles in the Rome Statute will be discussed in 




This chapter has sought to critique the interpretation of the principle of immunity in terms of 
customary international law. What is apparent is that immunity is granted in terms of the 
principle of par in parem non habet imperium and this has been demonstrated through case 
law. Officials could execute their duties without fear of prosecution. However, it would appear 
as if, for the purpose of universal jurisdiction, immunity can be limited to ensure that domestic 
courts are able to execute international prosecutions if necessary. This point was demonstrated 
in the Pinochet case, where personal immunity was still in operation, despite the fact that 
 
172 Article 27(2) of Rome Statute. 
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functional immunity was not recognised by the Court. However, this cannot be used as a 
precedent for all cases, since it appears as if the liability of each state official or head of state 
is decided on a case by case basis. In addition, the liability and procedure used for prosecution 
is dependent on the nature of the tribunal or court involved. 
 
In conclusion, although states are more likely to cede immunity to ensure prosecutions, the rule 
of customary law remains the same and does not change the fact that sitting heads of state enjoy 







 Immunity of a Head of State before the International Criminal Court  
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
The Rome Statute is an agreement between consenting states. However, regarding the statute, 
not every state is signatory to this agreement. The implication of this is that the jurisdiction of 
the treaty can be extended to non-member states only through a UNSC resolution. In discussing 
the immunity of heads of state before this international tribunal, the main focus of this chapter 
is on the International Criminal Court (ICC). The chapter will examine the rule of law 
pertaining to immunity for both non-state parties and state parties under the Rome Statute. The 
reason for taking this approach is that state party’s obligation towards the International 
Criminal Court is dissimilar to that of the non-state party ordinarily. This chapter will 
commence by providing the rationale for the existence of the ICC and a brief overview of the 
Court and its structure. The possible conflicting relationship between Articles 27 and 98 in the 
context of a state party to the Rome Statute before domestic courts will be canvassed in light 
of case law developments. 
 
3.2 Structure and Purpose of ICC 
 
The ICC was established by means of the United Nations General Assembly Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court in July 1998.  The Court was created with an aspiration to 
achieve justice for all, end impunity, help end conflicts, deter future war criminals and remedy 
the shortfalls of the ad hoc tribunals.173 In the words of Kofi Annan, former Secretary-General 
of the United Nations, “the promise of universal justice lies in the prospect of an International 
Criminal Court.”174  The Court was therefore established by a means of an agreement between 
states in terms of Article 1 of the Rome Statute. It is a permanent institution, and it is not 
restricted by geographical location, as  was the case previously with other courts that were 
established by the UNSC; the ICTY175and the ICTR.176 The Court’s statute has been signed by 
123 countries, 33 of those countries are African states, while 19 are from Asia-Pacific. It has 
 
173 Anoushirvani op cit n21 at 213 -14. 
174 Anoushirvani op cit n21 at 213-14. 
175 Schabas op cit n150 at 13; The first ad hoc tribunal was established in Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 1993. 
176 Schabas op cit n150 at 11-12; a Council created a second ad hoc Tribunal, the ICTR, in November 1994. 
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been reported that only 18 countries from Eastern Europe are signatory to the statute, and 28 
from Latin America and the Caribbean states.177 Countries that are accountable to the Court 
have to agree to ratify the Rome Statute.178 With regards to the Court’s jurisdiction, it has the 
power to exercise jurisdiction by investigating and trying the individuals accused of serious 
violations of international crimes as set out in Article 5.179 The crimes stipulated in terms of 
Article 5 of the Rome Statute, as confirmed by the Preamble of the Rome Statute “are affirmed 
as the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole. Such crimes 
must not go unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be ensured by taking 
measures at the national level and by enhancing international cooperation”. 
 
The statute is divided into 13 parts, which deal with the creation of the Court and stipulate its 
powers, functions and duties. Articles 1-4 establish the Court, while Articles 5-21 speak to its 
jurisdiction, admissibility and applicable law. The general principles of criminal law set out in 
Articles 22-33; and the composition and administration of the Court in found in Articles 34-
52. The procedural aspects of the Court’s functions are set out in Articles 53-111. The 
investigation and prosecution process is described in Articles 53-61; the trial in Articles 62-76; 
penalties in Articles 77-80; and the appeal and revision procedure in Articles 81-85. 
International cooperation and judicial assistance regarding complaints and investigations are 
discussed in Articles 86-102; while enforcement of the statute’s provisions is found in Articles 
103-111. The Assembly of States Parties is outlined in Article 112, financing provisions in 
Articles 113-118; and the final clauses in Articles 119-128.180 
 
This jurisdiction which the Court has is complementary to member states’ national courts 
criminal jurisdiction. This means that the Court will only have jurisdiction over a case if the 
state in question is not willing to prosecute or judge the individuals.181 The Court is an example 
of the profound revolution that has taken place across the international community, the purpose 
of which was to ensure that justice was not sacrificed at the altar of political expediency.182 
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https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails [Accessed on 26 February 2020]. 
178 Art. 125 (1-2) of the Rome Statute. 
179 Schabas op cit n150 at 11-12.  
180 United Nations Treaty Collections: Rome Statute of International Criminal Court.  
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails [Accessed on 26 February 2020]. 
181 AM Mangu ‘The International Criminal Court, Justice, peace and the fight against impunity in Africa: An 
overview’ (2015) 40 Africa Devel’t 7 at 10.  
182 P Lumumba ‘The Rome Statute and Omar Al-Bashir’s indictment by the International Criminal Court’ 
(2009) 39(2) Africa Insight 91, available at  https://doi.org/10.4314/ai.v39i2.51006. 
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However, despite the Court’s position and jurisdiction over disputes, it has no police force; and 
because of this, it is at times referred to as “a giant without limbs.”183  
 
Further, since the establishment of the ICC, it is debatable whether immunity of heads of state 
and senior state officials before the ICC and domestic tribunals continues to exist.184 Thus for 
the purpose of personal immunity, obtaining the cooperation of all the state parties will be 
challenging, since the immunity accorded under the principle of customary international law 
remains. This is because not every state is a member to this treaty. Therefore, their obligations 
towards the ICC will differ. However, non-member states can be subjected to the jurisdiction 
of the Court, in terms of Article 13 of the Rome Statute. This is because ICC can create 
obligations for non-state parties such as Sudan if it is brought before the ICC by way of a 
Security Council referral.  
 
It is therefore necessary to examine the tension that exists between Articles 27 and 98 of the 
Rome Statute to determine whether a head of state enjoys immunity before both the ICC and 
domestic courts. The remaining sections of this chapter will be grouped into two parts 
addressing this debate. The first part of the chapter discusses the immunity of a head of state 
before the international court and the second part focuses on the immunity of a head of state 
before the domestic courts. 
 
3.3 State Party Immunity before International Tribunal (ICC)  
 
At first glance, it would appear that Article 27(1) of the Rome Statute addresses the question 
of whether immunity is applicable to heads of state in both domestic and international law 
contexts.  Article 27(1) states that: 
“This Statute shall apply to all persons without any distinction based on official 
capacity. In particular, official capacity as a head of state or government, a member of 
Government or parliament, an elected representative or a government official shall in 
no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in 
and itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence.” 
 
183 D Tladi ‘The African Union and the International Criminal Court: The battle for the soul of international law’ 
(2009) 34(1) SAYIL 57 at 58-59. 





In addition, Article 27(2) of the Rome Statute goes beyond this and targets personal immunity, 
thereby subjecting to the jurisdiction of the ICC, sitting heads of state and government and 
other state officials who would otherwise be protected from prosecution by personal immunity. 
Article 27(2) reads as follows: 
 
“Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of a 
person, whether under national or international law, shall not bar the court from 
exercising its jurisdiction over such a person.”  
 
Therefore, in terms of Article 27, the immunity enjoyed by the heads of state of member states 
to the Rome Statute will no longer prevent prosecution before the ICC. Based on this rule, 
removing the immunity accorded to state party officials by another state to assist the ICC will 
be possible. However, as stated in the beginning of this section, it has been observed that the 
power in Article 27 to remove immunity of a head of state before an international criminal 
court, is only based on one section of article 27.  
 
It should also be noted that unlike customary international law, where distinction was made for 
both domestic and international tribunals, the ICC bars both personal and functional immunity 
of state officials at both the domestic and international tribunal. Therefore, the Court cannot 
impose such obligations on a state without obtaining proper consent. 
In terms of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, obtaining the consent of a state is 
crucial for the creation of obligations or rights. Further, as already established in the 
introduction of this chapter, the Rome Statute is a treaty, and thus this same rule will apply.  
Therefore, for Article 27 to apply it must operate within the laws of treaties. This also explains 
why consent was one of “the most delicate topics” during the establishment of the Court and 
why the Court’s jurisdiction is restrained or defined in terms of the following: subject matter 
(ratione materia), time (ratione tempris), space (ratione loci) and individuals (ratione 
personae), and through a referral by the Security Council, and anything outside of this will be 
a violation of law.185 Therefore, in the next section the jurisdiction of the International Criminal 
Court and its statute over non-state parties is examined. 
 





3.4 Non-State Party Immunity before the International Tribunal (ICC)  
 
Where a state is not a member to the Rome Statute, it is unclear whether the provisions of 
Article 27 of the Rome Statute can become binding on that state. However, the Rome Statute 
created an exception to this rule and there are instances whereby Article 27 can extend 
jurisdiction to non-state parties regardless of treaties or consent given.186 In essence, this means 
that the Rome Statute jurisdiction will apply to any states and individuals, regardless of their 
own state's policy, judicial institutions, or fundamental laws, and without its consent.187This 
exception can take the form of a Security Council referral. 
 
The Security Council’s primary responsibility and duty as the executive body of the United 
Nations is to ensure the existence of international peace and security.188 Furthermore, Article 
28 of the Rome Statute stipulates the power that the Security Council has to take decisions that 
are binding on all member states.189 Article 13 of the Rome Statute gives the Court jurisdiction 
with regards to crimes listed in Article 5 of the statute.190  
Therefore, this is a legal means for positive political intervention, and the Rome Statute allows 
the Security Council to influence the decision making of the Court to ensure world peace.191 In 
terms of Article 13 of the Rome Statute, there are three trigger mechanisms for the ICC, namely 
state party referral, referrals by the United Nations Security Council acting under Chapter VII 
 
186 Article 13.  
187 LA Casey & DB Rivkin ‘The limits of legitimacy: The Rome Statute's unlawful application to non-state 
parties’ (2003) 44 Virg Int’l L 63 at 72. 
188 Art. 13 of the Rome Statute.  
189 Art. 28. 
190 Art. 13. stipulates that:  
“The Court may exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a crime referred to in article 5 in 
accordance with the provisions of this Statute if: 
(a) A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been committed is referred 
to the Prosecutor by a State Party in accordance with article 14;  
(b) A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been committed is referred 
to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United 
Nations; or  
(c) The Prosecutor has initiated an investigation in respect of such a crime in accordance with 
article 15.” 
191 Art. 13(b) states that:  
“The court may exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a crime referred to in article 5 in accordance 
with the provisions of this statute if…(b) A situation in which  one or more of such crimes appears to 
have been committed is referred to the prosecutor by the security council acting under Chapter VII of 
the Charter of the united nations (: which stipulates that “the security council shall determine the 
existence of any threat to the peace breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make 
recommendations, or decide which measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42 to 
maintain or restore international peace and security.” 
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of the UN Charter and proprio motu investigation by the ICC Prosecutor. In the next paragraph 
the referral and its implications will be discussed. 
The existence of both personal and functional immunity either under customary international 
law or in terms of the Rome Statute has been the subject of debate. This is because countries 
are expected to uphold customary international law principles. This section of the chapter 
therefore aims at discussing the Darfur situation, with a view to examining how the Security 
Council extended the jurisdiction of the ICC over a non-state party to the Rome Statute.  
 
a) Referral of Darfur Situation by the UNSC 
 
In 2009, an arrest warrant against Al-Bashir was issued by the Pre-trial Chamber (PTC) of the 
ICC after conflict erupted in Darfur that arose back in 2003. This occurred as a result of the 
Sudanese government, backed by militias who attacked the civilian population.192 As a result, 
millions of citizens were raped, tortured and executed.193 This caused the Secretary General of 
the United Nations, Kofi Annan, to establish a commission of inquiry (International 
Commission of Enquiry on Darfur)194 to investigate all the allegations of violence and to 
determine if international crimes in terms of Article 5(a) of the Rome Statute had taken place.195 
The Commission concluded that not only did the crimes occur between 2003 and 2005, but 
further that the Sudanese government was unwilling or unable  to investigate or prosecute the 
crimes committed in Darfur196 which could be attributed to various factors such as lack of 
adequate infrastructure or authority.197 As a result of the report, the Commission approached 
the Security Council in light of the fact that the matter constituted a threat to international peace 
and security, to refer the matter to the ICC for further investigation and prosecution.198 The 
Security Council by applying Article 13(b) of the Rome statute of the ICC and Chapter VII of 
 
192 ‘Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmed Al-Bashir’ 
(ICC-02/05-01/09), and Pre-trial chamber I, (4 March 2009). 
193 Saxum ‘The ICC versus Sudan: How does the Darfur case impact the principle of complementarity, 6 years 
on’ (2009-10) 1 Eyes on the ICC 6. 
194 ‘Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General’ (25 
January 2005) available at http://www.un.org/News/ dh/sudan/com inq darfur.pdf] [Accessed on 22 
October 2018]. 
195 Saxum op cit n193 at 1. 
196 Saxum op cit n193. 
197 ‘Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General’ supra 
at 5. 
198 Saxum op cit n193 at 1. 
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the United Nation Charter, adopted Resolution 1593,199 thereby making it the first case to be 
referred by it to the ICC.200 
 
A referral as already indicated earlier on this chapter is one of the ways in which the Rome 
statute and the Court can exercise its jurisdiction over a state party without violating the law 
of treaties as stipulated in Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the law of treaties. 
However, despite the provision and such referral being made, the warrant of arrest for the 
former president of Sudan was pending and is still pending.201 
One of the arguments and explanation for the failure to execute his arrest and commence trial 
despite the referral by the Security Council was that the Security Council was a political body, 
and half of it permanent members (three out of the five members) are not even signatories to 
the statute. Thus, the argument is that such referral was more political in nature and it questions 
the legitimacy and the integrity of the Court.202  
Although the Court is an independent institution, due to the structure and nature of the Security 
Council, there is a likelihood of its being influenced with regards to certain decision. In 
addition, the Court gets its support from the Security Council and there is a likelihood that the 
Council can use such support as a bargaining chip should the ICC refuse to a referral made by 
them for their own or some of the permanent members’ political ties or their political 
interests.203 
b) Al-Bashir Warrant of Arrest Issued by Pre-Trial Chambers 
 
On 14 July 2008, the prosecution filed an application and the Pre-trial Chamber issued a 
warrant of arrest for Al-Bashir. In terms of Article 25(3)(a) of the Statute, the Pre-trial chamber 
noted that Al-Bashir played a significant role in indirectly committing war crimes and crimes 
against humanity. This could be attributed to the fact that he was in charge of Sudan’s security 
institutions such as the National Intelligence and Security Service, which also included militia 
groups, “the Janjaweed Militia.”204  
 
 
199 M Ssenyonjo ‘The International Criminal Court and the Warrant of Arrest for Sudan’s President Al-Bashir: 
A crucial step towards challenging impunity or a political decision?’ (2009) 78 Nordic J Int’l L 397.  
200 Ssenyonjo op cit n199 at 397.  
201 United Nations Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969. 
202 B Aregawi ‘The politicisation of the International Criminal Court by the United Nations Security Council 
referrals’ (2017) 2 Conflict Trends 27-32.  
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In March 2009, an arrest warrant was issued against Al-Bashir, charging him with two counts 
of war crimes and five counts of crimes against humanity. The warrant issued against Al-Bashir 
was noteworthy since it was the first to be issued against an incumbent president.205 A second 
application was filed for a second warrant of arrest to be issued for the crime of genocide.206 
The chamber was again satisfied that Al-Bashir was an indirect co-perpetrator in this crime.207 
 
A number of reasons are proffered for the investigation including international peace and 
security which triggered the SC jurisdiction in terms of Article 13(b).208 Since peace and 
reconciliation was a priority in war torn Sudan, it was necessary to foster conditions to create 
such peace and also ensure that members of government did not receive preferential 
treatment.209 In addition, since the Security Council gave its support for the prosecution by 
issuing the resolution, the state would have to comply.210 It could also be argued that since the 
ICC is well-established, in terms of its rules and procedures,211 the trial would be fair.212 Last 
and most importantly, the ICC would bring justice by immediately prosecuting the accused.213  
In light of the arrest warrants being issued, it is now necessary to consider Sudan’s position in 
relation to the extension of the ICC’s jurisdiction over Al-Bashir.  
c) Sudan’s Position on Al-Bashir’s Immunity.  
 
In considering the position of Sudan, the ICC’s legal framework is not explicit on how the 
Court should act when the Security Council refers a situation of a non-party to the Prosecutor 
under Article 13(b). It appears as if the Security Council’s referral means that the Rome Statute 
applies in its entirety as stipulated in terms of Article 1 of the Rome Statute.214 In other words, 
Sudan is now viewed as a state party to the Rome Statute. The reason this could be problematic 
is that there is a difference from a legal perspective, between state parties and non-state parties 
to the Rome Statute. Further, a referral merely extends the Court’s jurisdiction, it does not 
change the nature of a non-state party. Further, any obligation that arises for Sudan merely 
requires that Sudan fully cooperates in terms of the UN charter referral to arrest Al-Bashir. It 
 
205 Ibid. 
206 ‘Second Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir’ op cit n.  
207 Art. 25(3)(a), ‘Second Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir’supra.  






214 Article 1: “A person shall not be criminally responsible under this Statute unless the conduct in question 
constitutes, at the time it takes place, a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.” 
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creates similar obligations to that for a state party. It does not make it a state party. Therefore, 
Article 27(2) which completely removes the immunities of state parties, does not remove the 
immunity of non-state parties and therefore is not applicable to non-state parties. This was the 
position not only in Sudan but also in the cases of Malawi and the DRC, where the states could 
have executed arrest warrants, but Sudan refused to waive Al-Bashir’s immunity. This meant 
that the Court is bound by its own statute that provides for Article 98(1) which state parties can 
raise. Article 98(1) also provides clarity on how non-state parties are to be treated, noting that: 
 
 “the Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance which would 
require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international 
law with respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a person or property of a third 
State, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of that third State for the waiver 
of the immunity.”   
 
The conclusion that could be drawn is that the Security Council has explicitly waived the 
immunity of Al-Bashir. This position raises some important considerations. Since Sudan not a 
state party, the ICC can hold Al-Bashir accountable in terms of the United Nations Charter and 
can compel Sudan to waive immunity. Does this now imply that Sudan is a state party and 
therefore any customary international law which accords heads of state immunity has been 
removed? This would essentially violate the principle of sovereignty.  It could also be argued 
that since Sudan is a signatory to the Genocide Convention, immunity of the head of state has 
been waived. In addition, the Court’s actions have left the meaning of Article 98 unclear.215 
 
In conclusion, the confusion and questions surrounding the scope of head of state immunity 
remains. In addition, the ICC argument on immunity has not been developed or extended to fit 
into the traditional public international law. Therefore, it needs to properly define the 
relationship between the immunity of a head of state and the ICC as well as whether immunity 
applies before prosecutions in foreign domestic states. It should also be noted that the 
implication of the referral made by the Security Council216 in the Darfur case, is different from 
that of the International Court Tribunal of Yugoslavia (ICTY) and International Court Tribunal 
of Rwanda (ICTR). The ad hoc tribunal, which was the creation of the Security Council had 
 
215 E De Wet ‘The implications of the visit of Al-Bashir to South Africa for international and domestic law’ 
(2015) 13(5) J Int’l Crim Jus10-13.  
216 United Nation Security Council Resolution 1593 (2005). 
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broad authority to safeguard international peace and security, a power previously invoked to 
override immunities respectively in both the former Yugoslavia ("ICTY") and Rwanda 
("ICTR").217 Therefore, it could be argued that the referral made for the ad hoc tribunal was 
binding and placed obligations on all member states of the United Nations.218 However, the 
referral made in 2005219 is only binding on Sudan and urges member states to assist with the 
arrest of the wanted person.220 On this basis then it could be said that urging states to act does 
not give rise to an obligation, rather it is simply a recommendation that the state party can either 
choose to obey or ignore.221 This is because “the referral is explicitly an obligation on one non-
party (Sudan) and not explicit obligation for other states to cooperate with the court.”222 
 
Further, countries that have been accused of non-cooperation, specifically African countries223 
have been required to appear before the Bureau of the Assembly of States Parties to the ICC to 
explain their non-cooperation in arresting and detaining al-Bashir.224 Such an explanation is 
crucial in light of the fact that the ICC is heavily reliant on state cooperation in terms of Article 
86 which provides that “state parties shall in accordance with provision of statute cooperate 
fully with the court in its investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
court.” This cooperation, a general treaty obligation, is applicable not only to state parties but 
also non-state parties.225 The statute also requires all member states to ensure that their national 
laws also provide for the necessary procedures and cooperation that may be needed. Therefore, 
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countries’ reliance on conflicting obligations such as membership of the AU can no longer be 
regarded as an excuse. In addition, the issue of referrals such as Resolution 1593 that emanates 
from the Security Council referral, makes it clear that Article 25 of the UN Charter comes into 
play. This brings Sudan under the jurisdiction of the Rome Statute; it is expected of the member 
state to accept and carry out the decision of the Council. 
3.5    Immunity of Head of State before Domestic Courts in Relation to Cooperation with the 
ICC 
a) State Party Immunity before Foreign Domestic Court 
 
In terms of Article 86 of the Rome Statute, a member state has the obligation to cooperate fully 
by investigating and prosecuting offences. According to this section: 
 
 “States parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Statute, cooperate fully 
with the Court in its investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of 
the Court”  
Cooperation can take different forms. This can include transfer of persons, setting up of 
national legislation or offering of technical assistance. Furthermore, Article 88 of the Rome 
Statute creates procedures under national law that will enable state parties to cooperate with 
the Court in the manner provided for by Part 9 of the Rome Statute. So, while it indicates that 
cooperation is needed it does not indicate how it must go about doing so. For example, in terms 
of Article 89(1) there is a duty to surrender persons to the ICC: 
 
 “States Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Part and the procedure 
under their national law, comply with requests for arrest and surrender” and Article 
89(3) provides that “A State Party shall authorize, in accordance with its national 
procedural law, transportation through its territory of a person being surrendered.” 
 
Therefore, while legislation must be enacted to ensure cooperation, a state is unable to rely on 
national legislation to avoid its responsibility. Should the person being transferred bring a 
challenge before the national courts of a state party on the basis of ne bis in idem  and is the 
state party required to consult with the Court to determine whether an admissibility ruling has 
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been made?226 However, while there are extensive sections that regulate cooperation, it should 
be noted that there are certain exceptions to cooperation. These include competing requests, 
the ne bis in idem principle as stated in Article 20,227 and specifically immunity under Article 
98(1) and international agreements under Article 98(2).  
 
Article 98 also falls under Part 9 of the Rome Statute, a section that deals with cooperation of 
the member states. In terms of Article 98(1), the courts are prohibited from requesting 
cooperation in the form of surrender, especially if the request for surrender will be a violation 
of obligations towards another state or a violation of the rights of a representative of another 
state under international law. The intention of the drafters was to avoid creating conflicting 
obligations for state parties. The Article therefore, foresees and prohibits the Court from issuing 
requests that would put a state party in such a position of conflicting obligations unless waiver 
of immunity by the third state can be sought and obtained by the ICC.  
 
b) Non-State Party Immunity before a Foreign Domestic Court.  
 
As already mentioned, where non-member states have not ratified the Rome Statute, they 
have not renounced their official right to immunity. This is confirmed by Article 34 of 
the Vienna Convention which provides that a treaty obligation cannot be extended to a 
third state. Therefore, Article 27 of the Rome Statute remains applicable to a non-state 
party before an international tribunal only when there is a UNSC referral.  In addition, 
since Article 98(1) of the Rome Statute has clearly stipulated that assistance need only be 
given if the requested state does not act inconsistently with its obligations under 
international law or where the Court can obtain a waiver of immunity by a third state. 
Further, Article 98(2) directly addresses the host state obligations, authority, or 
jurisdiction over a third state official or property. In terms of this paragraph, the sending 
state, that is,  the third state and its officials, will remain under its own jurisdiction and 
not under the jurisdiction of the host state unless the sending state or third states waives 
the immunity accorded to its officials or the host state obtains the consent of the sending 
or third state.228  
 
226 L Yang ‘On the principle of complementarity in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’ (2005) 
4 Chinese J Int’l L 121; see Art. 17 Rome Statute. 
227 Rome Statute. 
228 MH Arsanjani ‘The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’ (1999) 93 Amer J Internat L 22 at 41.  
54 
 
There is a clear tension between Article 98(1) and 98(2) and Article 27(2). If the purpose of 
Article 98(1) was to prevent states from having competing obligations towards the ICC and 
other states, what purpose then does Article 98(2) serve? If an arrest warrant is issued to a state 
party in terms of Article 58 of the Rome Statute, requesting a foreign state court to arrest and 
surrender a non-state party official, it will be violating Article 98. Further, it is difficult to 
reconcile the possibility that Article 98(1) prohibits the ICC from requesting a state party to 
cooperate with it through arrest and surrender on the basis of its customary law obligations 
towards a third state. Article 27(2) grants the Court jurisdiction with regards to state officials 
and waives both personal and functional immunity before the international tribunal, regardless 
of the international rule of law in place. Therefore, immunities are irrelevant in cases before 
the ICC and would also then render Article 98 superfluous. While the main purpose of Article 
13 of the Rome Statute is to maintain peace and security, it can be brought about by giving the 
Security Council power in terms of Article 28 to make decisions that are binding on all member 
states such as ordering arrests. But again, Article 34 of the Vienna Convention clearly stipulates 
that treaties cannot be extended to third parties. This leaves the position unclear. It is therefore 
necessary to address the question of a multilateral agreement on personal immunity which is 
accorded to a non-state party under customary international law. Various case law 
developments demonstrate the tension between Articles 27 and 98. Some of these cases will 
now be discussed.  
 
3.6 The Republic of Malawi229  
 
In October 2011 President Al-Bashir visited Malawi to attend the Common Market for Eastern 
and Southern African (COMESA) summit. During his visit, a request was made in terms of 
Article 86 of the Rome Statute to Malawi’s embassy in Brussels by the ICC requesting the 
arrest and surrender of Al-Bashir within their territory.230  The Statute also requires all member 
states to ensure that their national laws provide for the necessary procedures and cooperation 
that may be needed. 
 
 
229 Prosecutor v Al-Bashir, Pre-Trial I, 12 December 2011 (ICC-02/05-01/09): ‘Corrigendum to the Decision 
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Malawi did not comply with the ICC request for two reasons. First, Malawi had a duty to 
respect Al-Bashir’s immunity in terms of the Immunities and Privileges Act of Malawi. 231 
Second, as a member of the African Union Malawi had to align itself with the African Union 
concerning indictment.232 It should also be noted that although Malawi ratified the Rome 
Statute, because it was a dualist state, international agreements entered into would not 
automatically form part of country’s laws unless domesticated.233 
 
The Court held that Malawi did not respect the Court’s authority, despite the fact that Article 
119(1) of the Rome Statute states that the Court has sole authority to decide issues of 
immunity.234 The Court was of the view that Malawi’s arguments were not persuasive since 
any immunity enjoyed was already rejected by the Court at the time it issued its first arrest 
warrant in 2009 in terms of Article 27 of the Rome Statute.235 
 
The Pre-trial chamber analysed the arguments advanced by Malawi. It noted that Article 98(1) 
of the Rome Statute only refers to international law and because immunity of a head of state is 
an international proceeding, it excludes any possibility for the requested state to rely on its 
national law.236 It therefore focused on the first part of the first argument advanced by the 
Court. The Court held that “customary international law creates an exception to the head of 
state immunity when an international court seeks a head of state’s arrest for the commission of 
international crimes.”237  
 
Immunity was rejected in terms of the Versailles Treaty and thus following this same reasoning 
with regards to the Al-Bashir case, the Pre-trial chamber held that his immunity no longer 
existed.238 In terms of the international rule of law, immunity of the head of state (Al-Bashir) 
cannot be raised to preclude prosecution before the international court.239 The Chamber also 
 
231 Malawi case para 8. 
232 Malawi case para 13. 
233 Section 211 of the Constitution of Malawi 1996 provides that: “(1) Any international agreement entered into 
after the commencement of this Constitution shall form part of the law of the Republic if so provided by or 
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acknowledged the tension that existed between Articles 27 and 98 and argued that Malawi 
cannot prioritise not following its obligations to the Rome Statute on Article 98.240 
 
The Court, after examining Articles 86, 87(7) and 89 of the Statute, came to the conclusion that 
the Republic of Malawi failed to meet its obligations in not bringing the issue of Al- Bashir’s 
immunity before the Chamber for determination and failed to cooperate by arresting and 
surrendering him, therefore impeding the Court’s ability to exercise its powers and functions 
under the Rome Statute.241 The Court also went on to state that by ratifying the Rome Statute, 
the state had implicitly waived immunity of the head of state under Article 27(2) where Article 
5 crimes are committed, thereby rendering customary international law exceptions to head of 
state immunity inapplicable.242  
 
The case was thus decided solely on the basis of Article 27, stating that immunities cannot be 
raised if the state has ratified the Rome Statute, since ratification meant that the defence 
provided in Article 98 was included in the purview of such ratification. This conclusion was 
arrived at by the Pre-trial chamber without providing any explanation as to what circumstances 
apply to prevent the ICC from requesting a state to cooperate. The lack of proper justification 
begs the question as to whether the ICC is biased against African states. 
 
3.7 The Republic of Chad in Conflict of Obligation towards the ICC 
 
This case involved an arrest warrant issued after Al-Bashir’s second visit to Chad requesting 
Chad to surrender him for the crime of genocide. On his first visit, the Pre-trial chamber issued 
a decision informing the UNSC of Al-Bashir’s visit to Chad. The Pre-trial chamber also noted 
that on the basis of Resolution 1593 of 2005 as well as Article 87 of the Rome Statute, Chad 
had an obligation to cooperate. Despite the fact that both Sudan and Chad were required to take 
the necessary steps to ensure the arrest of Al-Bashir, instead of arresting him, the security 
minister indicated that Al- Bashir cannot be subjected to an arrest by a host country. As a result, 
he visited the country for the presidential inauguration in 2011 without incident. 243 
 
240 Malawi case paras 37-43. 
241 Malawi case para 47. 
242 Malawi case para 43. 
243 ’Decision pursuant to article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the refusal of the Republic of Chad to comply 
with the cooperation requests issued by the Court with respect to the arrest and surrender of Omar Hassan 
Ahmad Al Bashir’ (13 December 2011) 
     (ICC-02/05-01/09-140) at paras 6-9. (Chad case). 
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The registrar of the ICC sent a note verbally indicating that Chad had a duty of cooperation 
under the Rome Statute to arrest Al-Bashir, but Chad did not respond.244 Chad’s failure to arrest 
and surrender Al-Bashir was once again condemned by the Pre-rial chamber and the matter 
was referred to the UNSC and the Assembly of States Parties.245 Instead, Chad used Article 98 
as a defence which was rejected by the Pre-trial chamber.246 
Chad once again failed it obligation towards the ICC in 2013 during a further visit by Al-
Bashir. This time the country did not provide any reason for its failure to arrest him. Chad was 
again reprimanded247 by the ICC. Two more visits occurred after this incident and no arrest or 
surrender was made to the ICC. What is interesting about this case is that when the AU told 
countries not to cooperate, Chad did raise an objection in relation to a particular paragraph: 
 
“…decides that in view of the fact that the request by the African Union has never been 
acted upon, the AU Member States shall not cooperate pursuant to the provisions of 
Article 98 of the Rome Statute of the ICC relating to immunities, for the arrest and 
surrender of President Omar Al-Bashir of the Sudan.”248  
 
Although Chad initially did not cooperate, it eventually explained to the ICC why it did not 
cooperate. This was based on the common position adopted by the African Union, therefore 
politically motivated in respect of the international warrant of arrest issued by the Prosecutor 
against Al-Bashir.249 
 
Instead of developing or resolving the conflict pertaining to the issue of immunity relating to 
Articles 27 and 98, the Pre-trial chamber,250 applied the reasoning adopted in the Malawi 
Court.251 The Court chose to emphasise the obligation which Chad had to abide by the ICC 
cooperation request and arrest President Al-Bashir.252 This same pattern was demonstrated in 
the DRC and South Africa cases. Thus, it appears as if the approach adopted by the Court 
rendered the meaning of Article 98(1) superfluous. 
 
244 Chad case para 9. 
245 Chad case para 14. 
246 Chad case para 10. 
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58 
 
3.8 The Democratic Republic of Congo253 in Conflict of Obligation towards the ICC  
 
In 2014, the Chamber was notified of the possibility of Al-Bashir travelling to the DRC for the 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) summit in Kinshasa. The 
Chamber requested the DRC to take the necessary steps to ensure that the two arrest warrants 
issued against Al-Bashir were executed, in line with its obligations in terms of the Rome 
Statute.254 However, the DRC failed in its obligations in terms of Articles 86 and 89 of the 
Security Council resolution255 stating that due to the delay in notifying attendees at the summit 
made it difficult to determine the legal implications of diplomatic immunity.256  
 
The Pre-trial chamber did not accept the court’s reasoning since the DRC was a signatory state 
and expected the DRC to execute the arrest warrant issued against Al-Bashir.257 This was 
because the DRC had known for years that they were under this obligation. In addition, given 
the nature of the situation, the DRC should have notified the Court of the situation.258 Although 
the Court acknowledged that heads of state are entitled to immunity, Article 27(2) effectively 
removes this customary law immunity before the ICC.259 Therefore, the DRC’s failing to 
cooperate had rendered the Security Council decision useless.260 
 
The Pre-trial II chamber also noted that since Sudan is not a party to the Rome Statute its 
obligation towards the statute will be in terms of the UN Charter and the Security Council 
Resolution 1593.261 This stance is questionable in light of the fact that states should have a 
choice as to whether to enter into treaty obligations as well as violating the principle of parem 
non habet imperium. This principle is one of the pillars of the United Nations and  sovereign 
 
253 ‘The Prosecutor V. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir: Decision on the Cooperation of the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo Regarding Omar Al-Bashir’s Arrest and Surrender to the Court’ (9 April 2014) 
(ICC-02/05-01/09) para 5. (DRC case). 
254 DRC case para 5. 
255 See note 10. This resolution is meant to remove any impediment to the proceedings and article 103 of the UN 
Charter does answer the issue of obligations. (Article 103 notes that “in the event of a conflict of obligation 
between member of the United Nations under the present charter and their obligations under any other 
international agreement, their obligations under present charter shall prevail.”) 
256 DRC case paras 11-14, 32, and 34.  
257 DRC case para 34. 
258 Ibid. 
259 N Dyani-Mhango ‘South Africa’s dilemma: Immunity laws, international obligations, and the visit by 
Sudan’s President Omar Al-Bashir’ (2017) 26  Wash Int’l L J 535 at 553. See Also DRC case para 25. 
260 DRC case at para 33. 
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equality.262 Thus, by looking at the language used in the referral, it is clear that the United 
Nations did not bind all states but Sudan.263 
 
3.9 SALC: South Africa in Conflict of Obligations towards the ICC 
 
In South African Litigation Centre v the Minister of Justice and Development264 the court dealt 
with the failure of the South African government to arrest and surrender President Al-Bashir 
to the ICC during his visit to the 25th African Union Summit in Johannesburg, in pursuance of 
its obligations to arrest and surrender him.265 As a result of the government’s failure to act, the 
South African Litigation Centre (SALC) instituted legal action against the Minister of Justice 
in the Gauteng High Court requesting an interim order preventing Al-Bashir from leaving the 
country. The order further compelled the government to arrest the Sudanese president and 
surrender him to the ICC. However, at the time that the verdict was delivered, Al- Bashir had 
already left the country.266 The South African Litigation Centre then applied to the high court 
regarding the government’s failure to act. The high court was of the view that the South African 
government’s obligations in terms of the Rome Statute, was that Al-Bashir’s immunity was not 
excluded and therefore could be arrested and subject to the court’s jurisdiction.267   
 
In addition, the court made reference to Security Council Resolution 1593, which implicitly 
waived immunity of the President.268 The court also canvassed the contents of the Host State 
Agreement.269 In this respect, it noted that the agreement itself does not confer immunity on 
member states or their representatives but rather to delegates of intergovernmental 
organisations.270 The high court was of the view that any justification given by the South 
African government to explain failure to obey the court order of 14 June 2015, was a failure to 
meet its obligations in terms of the Rome Statute. 271 Therefore, immunity had been waived.272  
 
262 Dyani-Mhango op cit n259 at 557. 
263 Dyani-Mhango op cit n259 at 559. 
264 Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development v Southern African Litigation (867/15) [2016] ZASCA 17 
and Southern Africa Litigation Centre v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development (27740/2015) 
[2015] ZAGPPHC 402. 
265 Dyani-Mhango op cit n259 at 561. 
266 Southern Africa Litigation Center supra paras 25. 
267 Southern Africa Litigation Center supra paras 25- 33. 
268 Southern African Litigation Center supra paras 28 and 29.  
269 ‘General Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Organization of African Unity’ (OAU 
Convention) art VIII (2010). 
270 Southern African Litigation Center supra para 29. 
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On appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA), the following arguments were raised and 
addressed. First, immunity granted to the head of state in terms of Section 4(1)(a) of the 
Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges Act (DIPA) 37 of 2001 is irrelevant in relation to the 
immunity of the ICC. Rather, it was only concerned with section 10(9) which deals with the 
surrender of a person properly arrested pursuant to an ICC warrant.273  Such a person (whose 
acts falls under the crime in terms of Article 5 of the Rome Statute) is precluded from raising 
immunity as a defence to surrender.274 Regarding the issue of the content of the Host 
Agreement, which formed the primary agreement at the high court, the SCA concluded that the 
definition of an organisation in terms of Section 1 of the DIPA did not apply to member states 
but to inter-governmental organisations.275 
 
Therefore, in conclusion, the SCA granted the application for leave to appeal. It held that the 
conduct by the government, when it failed to arrest and surrender Al-Bashir during his visit for 
the AU meeting, was inconsistent with South Africa’s obligations in terms of the Rome Statute 
and Section 10 of the Implementation of the Rome Statute of the ICC Act 27 of 2002 and 
therefore was unlawful.276 
 
3.10 Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir (Jordan) 
 
In the case of Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir, dealt with non-compliance by 
Jordan regarding a request to arrest and surrender Al-Bashir. The appeal chamber, in following 
the reasoning of the Malawi case, dismissed head of state immunity, arguing that there is 
neither state practice nor an impelled sense of such a practice as law, which would support the 
existence of head of state immunity under customary international law, in relation to an 
international criminal court in the exercise of its proper jurisdiction. On this basis, customary 
international law could not serve as a basis failing in its obligations.277  
 
 
273  Southern African Litigation Center suprapara 44. 
274  Southern African Litigation Center supraparas 43-45. 
275 Southern African Litigation Center paras 41-43. 
276 Southern African Litigation Center para 113; see also A Mukuditi, ‘Judicial integrity and independence: The 
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In relation to the above discussion, the following points are salient. The arguments raised by 
the courts in the cases of Chad and Malawi seems to attest to the fact that many African states 
have viewed Article 98(1) as redundant in light of their obligations towards the AU not to 
cooperate. In addition, whether states cooperate or at least are able to enforce their obligations, 
is dependent upon domesticating legislation such as in the Malawi case. Matters are further 
exacerbated by the political relations between states, especially in the case of Sudan and Chad 
which was advanced as one of the central reasons for failure to cooperate. In the SALC case, 
the chambers adopted a different reason and according to the Chambers the referral by the 
United Nation Security Council, placed Sudan in similar position as a state party to the ICC. 
The predominant view of the ICC over the span of the decided cases seems to be that heads of 
state have no immunity before the international tribunal in terms of Article 27(1) and Article 
27(2) and the same rules apply to every foreign domestic court that failed its obligation to arrest 
and surrender Al-Bashir. However, the manner in which the chambers arrived at this conclusion 
has not always been well grounded. In light of the tension between Articles 27 and 98 because 
of the duty of African states to the AU, it is now necessary to consider what impact this 
relationship has on states obligations in terms of the ICC.  
 
3.11 The Relationship between the AU and the ICC  
 
Most African states seem to have an issue with the ICC, including the African Union. Thus, if 
immunity were to be excluded, the question then is whether Article 98 (1) may be relied upon 
by states to refuse cooperation. This point is salient in light of the fact that Africa is the biggest 
bloc of state parties to the Rome Statute.278 Furthermore, all of the active cases that the ICC is 
prosecuting are in Africa and these cases are relatively uncontroversial—they certainly did not 
appear to trouble the African state parties.279 However, this changed with the referrals of the 
Sudan-Darfur crisis to the UNSC and once the arrest warrant against Al-Bashir was issued, the 
hostility grew among many African states. Most African leaders have criticised the ICC’s 
constant targeting of the African countries as primary sources of prosecutions. These actions 
have undermined African sovereignty.280 This coupled with the fact that half of the African 
 
278 M Swart & K Krisch ‘Irreconcilable differences? An analysis of the standoff between the African Union and 
the International Criminal Court’ (2014) 1 Afr J Int’l Crim Jus 38 at 40. 
279 K Mills ‘Bashir is dividing us: Africa and the International Criminal Court’ (2012) 34 Hum Rts Q 40. 
280 SJ Tilden ‘Africa's conflict with the International Criminal Court: The African Court of Justice and Human 
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states are not signatories to the Rome Statute as well as the fact that the ICC lacks jurisdiction 
to undertake investigations and prosecutions is problematic.  
 
Various decisions have collectively sought to regulate the relationship between African state 
parties to the Rome statute and the ICC. What is apparent is that the African Union urges its 
member states to refuse cooperation with the ICC by not arresting and surrendering President 
Al-Bashir to the court. There are various reasons for this which will only briefly be discussed 
as this falls outside the scope of this discussion. 
 
The first reason given was that trying Al-Bashir and demanding his arrest has jeopardised the 
peace and reconciliation process in Sudan and the continent at large. Furthermore, it also led 
to the failure to uphold the ICC obligations by most members of the Rome Statute.281 Second, 
the African Union, believes that head of states, particularly those of non-state parties to the 
Rome Statute, should be immune from prosecution. However, the ICC prosecutor seems to 
disagree with such a view. According to the prosecutor, the Darfur situation was categorised 
as “ongoing genocide" and Al-Bashir was said to be the mastermind behind such crime, 
including crimes against humanity, and war crimes. Therefore, the Court had jurisdiction over 
Sudan through Security Council Resolution 1593 of March 2005. The Sudanese government 
has seemed reluctant and consistently refused to investigate allegations of such crimes 
committed by its high-ranking officials.282 The third reason as to why the AU has urged its 
members not to cooperate with the ICC, is because the African union as an organisation has 
constantly sought deferral of the case against Al-Bashir in terms of Article 16 of the Rome 
Statute. The AU Peace and Security Council, in an emergency meeting, expressed concern over 
Southern Sudan splitting if the peace process were interrupted by ICC action against Al-Bashir. 
Furthermore, the Nigerian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ojo Maduekwe, predicted that if Al-
Bashir were to be arrested, the whole country could turn into ‘one huge graveyard’. Despite 
these concerns, the UNSC has not responded to these concerns and most of these predictions 
have materialised.283 Instead of seeing Africa as a place where national reconciliation, political 
settlement of crisis and the consolidation of peace in Sudan can be achieve and promoted, it 
has fuelled the tension between the ICC and African states. 
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Furthermore, by virtue of their African Union membership, most African states have an 
obligation in terms of Article 23 to comply with policies of African Union. Article 23 compels 
member states to comply with the policies of the AU: 
 “...any Member State that fails to comply with the decisions and policies of the Union 
may be subjected to other sanctions, such as the denial of transport and communications 
links with other Member States, and other measures of a political and economic nature 
to be determined by the Assembly.”284 
This has complicated the relationship between the ICC and the African union, as the same 
African Union members are also members of the ICC. Therefore, such provision will result in 
non-cooperation with the ICC. On the other hand, there is another source of duty to cooperate 
with the ICC in the form of the UNSC Resolution 1593 which is binding on all UN member 
states. Despite this resolution, the AU continues to rely on Article 98 to urge its members to 
refuse to cooperate despite the ICC decision that the Article cannot be relied on in this manner. 
 
In addition to the role of the African Union, the African Court of Justice influenced various 
Rome Statute state parties from the African continent to submit applications for withdrawal of 
its membership. Further, it has pushed the idea of establishing an African court with jurisdiction 
over international crime.285  
 
Conclusion  
The International Criminal Court as discussed within the chapter was established for the 
purpose of fighting crime and promoting peace within the international community. However, 
in its attempt to achieve its purpose and function the court did encounter various difficulties 
and one of such was with regards to personal immunity.  
Personal immunity has been problematic and hence the subject of much debate. There are 
conflicting views as to whether it still exists in international law. While arguments have been 
advanced in Chapter 2 suggesting that personal immunity still exists, Chapter 3 demonstrates 
that the ICC has seemingly renounced personal immunity for crimes committed under 
international law. This is demonstrated by the fact that the ICC lacks its own enforcement 
mechanisms and relies heavily on its member states and their cooperation in the executing of 
 
284 Article 23 of Constitutive Act of the African Union (2000). 
285 Swart & Krisch. op cit n279 at 43. 
64 
 
arrest warrants. In addition, Article 27(2) suggests that immunity is no longer in operation. 
However, the question of immunity is still exacerbated by the conflict that exists between 
Articles 27 and 98 of the Rome Statute, most notably Article 98 citing a ‘dilemma between two 
conflicting obligations’ of state parties as a reason. In addition, the extension of the Court’s 
jurisdiction to non-state parties, such as that of Sudan and its former President Omar Al-Bashir, 
has led to the reluctance of state parties to the Rome Statue to execute the arrest and surrender.  
The referral by the Security Council could have facilitated the process and enabled the arrest. 
However, the integrity of the Court by most state parties, including the African Union was 
questioned. As a regional organisation the institution facilitated and encouraged state parties 
into boycotting the Court, thus, highlighting the delicate nature of the Court’s jurisdiction. 
Furthermore, the two articles within the statute that create two opposing obligations, also seem 
to be a contributing factor. If the drafters of the Rome Statute could draft two conflicting 
Articles, i.e. 27 and 98, is it also not possible that the interpretation of personal immunity before 
the international tribunal and a foreign domestic court was drafted with such intention in mind? 
It is now necessary to consider the tensions between these two Articles with a view to clarifying 

























The Rome Statute is a treaty and in terms of the interpretation provisions relating to immunity, 
it could be argued that it only binds state parties, that is, those parties who are signatories to it. 
Therefore, non-state parties such as Sudan, cannot be subject to the jurisdiction of the 
International Criminal Court except when certain proceedings are followed. This however, is 
problematic in light of the overall mandate of the Rome Statute with regards to immunity, 
which is set out in Article 27, which aim is to end impunity for heads of state who are accused 
of committing serious crimes as set out in Article 5.286 It is also problematic in light of the 
manner in which the courts arrived at their conclusion that a sitting head of state could forfeit 
immunity. It is these decisions, to which we now turn to discuss this potential conflict, with a 
view to resolving this conflict.  
 
4.2 No Tension between Article 27 And 98 of the Rome Statute 
 
Whether Article 27 of the Rome Statute removes immunity, has significant consequences for 
interstate relations. This is because heads of state and other state officials are entitled to both 
functional and personal immunity,287 the latter being the focus of this dissertation. This position 
is compounded by the fact that many countries, such as South Africa, although members of the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, have other conflicting obligations by which 
they are bound, thereby making arrests and surrender of an indicted head of state difficult. For 
example, many African states are also members of the African Union or other treaties.288  Some 
 
286 Tladi op cit n18 at 307. 
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of these conflicting obligations have been analysed in the cases of Malawi (2011),289 Chad 
(2011 and 2013),290 the Democratic Republic of Congo (2014), and South Africa (2015).291  
 
What is clear is that the purpose of Article 27 has been to remove immunities not only at 
national but also international level for state and non-state parties alike. This renders the 
purpose of Article 98(1) unclear because in cases where states were asked to cooperate with 
requests for arrest and surrender of heads of state, such as in the case of Al-Bashir, they could 
simply refuse on the basis of their customary law obligations, as well as the right to immunity.  
By including Article 98(1), the intention of the drafters, it could be argued, was to avoid 
creating conflicting obligations for state parties. The Article, therefore, foresees and prohibits 
the Court from issuing requests that would put a state party in such a position of conflicting 
obligations unless waiver of immunity by the third state can be sought and obtained by the ICC. 
In addition, Article 98(2) directly addresses the host state’s obligations, authority, or 
jurisdiction over a third state official or property. In terms of this Article, the sending state, that 
is, the third state and its officials, will remain under its own jurisdiction  and not under the 
jurisdiction of the host state unless the sending state or third state waives the immunity 
accorded to its officials or the host state obtains the consent of the sending or third state.292  
 
This Article is problematic, since it could not have been the intention of the drafters of the 
Rome Statute. As was noted in the Malawi case, “to interpret article 98(1) in such a way so as 
to justify not surrendering Omar Al-Bashir on immunity grounds would disable the Court and 
international criminal justice in ways completely contrary to the purpose of the Statute Malawi 
has ratified.”293 Further, the lack of clarity surrounding the meaning of Article 27 was further 
compounded by the findings in Malawi and Chad, where the courts did not even address the 
conflict between Articles 27 and 98 but simply focused on Article 98, arguing that the state 
cannot rely on Article 98 to justify its failure to comply with the arrest and cooperation request. 
Although the reason Malawi failed in its obligation towards the Court, had to do with the 
obligation it had in terms of national and international law, which was to grant heads of state 
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291 Jordan case; Prosecutor v. Al-Bashir: Decision under Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the Non-
Compliance by South Africa with the Request by the Court for the Arrest and Surrender of Omar Al-Bashir 
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immunity.294 In addition, since Malawi was a dualist state, although it had ratified the Rome 
Statute, this did not mean that such an international agreement would automatically form part 
of a country’s laws unless domesticated,295 which was not the case here. Therefore, as a 
member of the AU, Malawi had to comply with the AU’s decisions, which urged it member 
states not to arrest and surrender Al-Bashir in terms of Article 98 of the Rome Statute.296 In the 
case of Chad, the Pre=trial chamber,297  instead of developing the law to address the issues 
around immunity, simply chose to follow the same line of reasoning applied in the Malawi 
case.298 The main issue was the conflict between Articles 27 and 98, and this was not 
addressed.299 This was also the position adopted in the DRC case. The Chamber did not see 
any conflict of obligations between Article 27(2) and 98. Instead, the chamber held that Article 
98(1) was rather the solution to the conflict because it provided the Court with procedures or 
steps of arresting a non-state party.300 The Chamber’s argument was that Article 98(1) provided 
state parties with an exception that enabled cooperation and provided the Court with procedures 
which enabled state parties and the Court to secure cooperation of a third state (non-state party) 
through a waiver of the head of state personal immunity. In addition, such a procedure also 
prevented and protected the requested state from acting inconsistently with its international 
obligations towards the non-state party. The Chamber further added that since the Security 
Council had issued Resolution 1593(2005), such a resolution was sufficient to subject a head 
of state to the Court’s jurisdiction.301 
 
What became clear was that Malawi and the other state parties cannot use Article 98, to not 
follow its obligations to arrest Al-Bashir or fulfill its obligations towards the Court. As the 
Court noted: 
 
“[t]he fact that the PTC in most of the cases mentioned denied the application of Article 
98 as a defence and offered little or insufficient explanation or under what 
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circumstances Article 98 (1) would apply to prevent the ICC from requesting a state to 
cooperate, was also criticised. This is because, such dismissal from the PTC without 
proper justification somewhat reinforces the notion that the ICC is prejudiced against 
African leaders”. 302 
 
This explains the impetus for the creation of the African Court of Justice. The conflict between 
Articles 27 and 98 led to a deterioration of the relationship between the African Union and the 
ICC and may have contributed towards the push for an extension to the jurisdiction of the 
African Court of Justice.303 
 
To summarise, a direct reading of Article 27 indicates that state parties have waived any 
immunities in relation to the application of the Rome Statute. This would include the 
cooperation regime in Part IX304 which was raised in the Malawi and other cases already 
discussed.305 Further, Article 27 is therefore a waiver for the immunities provided for in Article 
98. In other words, there is no conflict between Articles 27 and 98 and the sections are 
complementary. Article 27(2) makes it clear that immunities under national or international 
law ‘shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction.’306  
 
 
 This was the view held by the Pre-trial chamber decision in the Malawi case, where the Court 
argued that Sudan in fact had no defence; even the customary international law defence of head 
of state immunity, hadin fact been rejected since World War I. 307 In addition, the Court was of 
the view that immunity had been removed where countries were members of to the Rome 
Statute.308 This is noteworthy, because if Article 27(2) does not remove immunity before 
foreign domestic states, the ICC would only be able to exercise jurisdiction in exceptional 
cases, such as where a home state has waived immunity by voluntarily surrendering its head of 
state. 
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In addition, it could be argued that the meaning is clearly set out when one views the Rome 
Statute in its entirety. In relation to Article 98, which makes use of the word ‘requested state’ 
the rest of the Rome Statute makes use of the phrase ‘non-contracting state’ in reference to 
‘non state party’.  This means third party states and not the requested state. However, this would 
result in the heads of state who enjoyed personal immunity never being brought to trial. Further, 
if Article 27(2) does not remove immunity before domestic foreign courts and the ICC, then 
why does it specifically state that “criminal proceedings instituted before the Court cannot be 
prevented by the fact that the accused enjoys immunities deriving from International Law”? 
 
Theorists such as Tladi still hold the view that Article 98 does have a role to play. He rejected 
the Pre-trial chamber’s argument that immunity was removed during World War 1.309 If this 
had been the case, then why has precedent in the form of the Pinochet and Arrest Warrant 
cases clearly indicate that they are entitled to immunity. In addition, why did the drafters of the 
Rome Statute include Article 27(1) which deals with immunity? Further, it could be argued 
that heads of state only enjoy immunity during their term of office and this is subsequently 
removed after they exit office. 
 
4.3 Tension between Articles 27 And 98 
 
The second view is that there is tension between Article 27 and 98. Article 27 should be widely 
interpreted and Article 98 narrowly interpreted in order to include non-state parties such as 
Sudan to ensure cooperation. This was the view held in the SALC case by the Pre-trial chamber 
that held that South Africa failed in its obligation to arrest and surrender Al-Bashir whose 
immunity was removed on the basis of the referral which was made by the UNSC. In addition, 
the Chamber pointed out that the reason why Sudan also did not enjoy immunity, was because 
it was a party to the Genocide Convention.310  
 
Regarding referrals, it was previously stated that one of the main purposes of Security Council 
referrals is to “promote peace and security.” Therefore, in terms of Article 28, the Security 
Council has the power to take decisions that are binding on all member states.311 Since the 
 
309 Malawi case supra para 38-42, Tladi as cited in Dyani-Mhango op cit260 footnote 208. 
310 De Wet op cit n215 at10-13. 




resolution is issued in terms of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, Article 103 of the 
United Nations Charter, will also be applicable. Article 13(b) is thus important in relation to 
intra-state conflicts involving states that are not party to the Rome Statute (such as Sudan); 
because these states could be directly or indirectly involved in atrocities and would be beyond 
the reach of the ICC.312 On this basis then, the referral placed Sudan (a non-member state) in a 
similar position of a state party to the Rome Statute.  Accordingly Article 13(b) of the Rome 
Statute, is binding on all member states,313 giving  the Court jurisdiction with regards to crimes 
listed in Article 5 of the Statute that were committed in Darfur. By extending the ICC 
jurisdiction over a non-state party, it could be argued that the aim therefore is to end impunity 
in terms of Article 27(1) and (2) of the Statute.314 In addition, Article 86 provides that states 
parties must fully cooperate with the investigation and prosecution of crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the court.”315 Therefore, had the South African Court in the SALC case, assigned 
a ‘narrow’ interpretation to Article 27(2), it would never be able to exercise jurisdiction over 
Sudan. Similarly, “requiring special procedural rules - outside and additional to Article 27(2), 
as South Africa asserted - to cooperate with the International Criminal Court with regard to 
persons who enjoyed official immunity would create ”an insurmountable obstacle to the Court's 
ability to exercise its jurisdiction”316  
 
 
“In addition to other grounds of criminal responsibility under this Statute for crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court:  
(a) A military commander or person effectively acting as a military commander shall be criminally 
responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court committed by forces under his or her effective 
command and control, or effective authority and control as the case may be, as a result of his or her 
failure to exercise control properly over such forces, where:  (i)  That military commander or person 
either knew or, owing to the circumstances at the time, should have known that the forces were 
committing or about to commit such crimes; and (ii)  That military commander or person failed to take 
all necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their commission or 
to submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.   
(b)  With respect to superior and subordinate relationships not described in paragraph (a), a superior shall 
be criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court committed by subordinates under 
his or her effective authority and control, as a result of his or her failure to exercise control properly over 
such subordinates, where: (i) The superior either knew, or consciously disregarded information which 
clearly indicated, that the subordinates were committing or about to commit such crimes; (ii)  The crimes 
concerned activities that were within the effective responsibility and control of the superior; and (iii) The 
superior failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or repress 
their commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.” 
312 Ibid.  
313 Art. 28 Rome Statute. 
314 S Bullock ‘Prosecuting President Al-Bashir and the short arms of justice’ (2013) 25 Denning LJ 197 at 198. 
315 Art. 86 Rome Statute. 
316 CF Swanepoel ‘The Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir, International Criminal 
Court, July 2017’ (2018) 51 De Jure 173 at 178. 
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On the basis of the above reasoning, it could be argued that Sudan was also bound to the Statute, 
Article 27 included.317 This was also the stance taken by the Pre-trial chamber II in the DRC 
case where the court held that since Sudan is not party to the Rome Statute, it’s obligation 
towards the statute will be in terms of the UN Charter and the Security Council Resolution 
1593.318 It is also worth noting that unlike ad hoc tribunals such as the ICTY and ICTR,319 
which were created by the UNSC, and broad authority to ensure international peace, this would 
supersede any immunity enjoyed by those heads of states. This also accords with the Amnesty 
International view that the Security Council has accepted that the legal regime of the ICC in its 
entirety will be applicable to Darfur. In relation to Resolution 1593,320 it was only applicable 
to Sudan.321 In other words, member states could assist with arrest but were not compelled to 
do so.322 The end result is that Article 103 trumps any reliance on any AU decisions that no 
sitting head of state shall be required to appear before an International Court or tribunal or any 
customary law provision that hinders the Court from exercising its power.323 When the ICC 
has jurisdiction over a matter, the SC referral is used merely as a means through which the ICC 
obtains jurisdiction over a matter.324 Therefore, the SC referral falls away and any obligation 
will now emanate from the Rome Statute itself. As Swanepoel notes, “the process that would 
ensue was always to be undertaken in terms of the Court’s legal framework. Put differently, 
the Court was to exercise its jurisdiction, according to the provisions of its statute in its 
entirety”325  It could be argued that such a view is problematic since it goes against the rules of 
international law, which require states to enter a treaty before such a treaty becomes binding 
on them.326 It also does not give them the option to enter one, depriving them of their 
autonomous choice, and leading to abuse of power over weaker states. 
 
 
317 South Africa PTC II Judgement op cit n293. 
318 Dyani-Mhango op cit n260 at 552, See Also DRC Case supra para 24. 
319 Greenawalt op cit n217) at 394. 
320 The Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter and pursuant to article 13(b) of the Rome 
Statute, referred the situation in the Darfur region of Sudan to the ICC in 2005, thereby bringing the crimes 
committed in Darfur within the jurisdiction of the court, Art. 13 The Rome Statute.. 
321 Ibid 343. 
322 Du Plessis op cit n at 110-112. The minority judgment in the PTC provided a different reasoning as to why 
Al-Bashir immunity cannot bar his arrest and surrender. Since Al-Bashir was charged with genocide and 
Sudan is also party to the Genocide convention, Al-Bashir immunity can be removed in terms of the 
Convention 
323 Swanepoel op cit n317 at 50; Bullock op cit n at 198. 
324 Swanepoel op cit n317 at 180. 
325 Swanepoel op cit n317 at 180. 
326 Dyani-Mhango op cit n260 553, 554. 
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However, at this juncture, it should be noted that there are human rights obligations which must 
be respected and are in accordance with customary law treaties and rules, which supportthe 
argument that Sudan is obliged to cooperate with the ICC.327 For example, it has already been 
noted that state parties like South Africa and non-state parties such as Sudan are members of 
the Genocide Convention and Article VI requires suspects be tried in national or international 
courts. Therefore, where a country has ratified the Convention, they have an obligation to 
cooperate with the ICC even where they are not signatories to the Rome Statute. In doing this, 
states could have the ICJ determine the dispute about non-cooperation.328 In addition, Article 
VI states that when an international tribunal is established, contracting parties “which shall 
have accepted its jurisdiction” must cooperate with it. Therefore, it calls into question the 
seeking of a deferral of ICC investigations in terms of Article 16, which is a provision that 
requires the ICC to refrain from commencing with an investigation or proceeding with a 
prosecution, for a period of 12 months (renewable), if the Security Council so requests in a 
resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. It also calls into question the 
independence of the ICC,329 since peace efforts were only intensified in that region at the time 
of request for the arrest of Al-Bashir, and made nonsense of the 2010 Kampala Review 
Conference which held that siting head of state could jeopardise effective cooperation with the 
ICC.330 
 
Another view suggests that the matter concerns procedural issues. There are two opposing 
views here. For example, just because immunity does not apply before the ICC in terms of 
Article 27, it does not mean that the customary international law position is affected. Although 
the North Gauteng High Court in the SALC case, attempted to emphasise this point by noting 
the ‘serious nature of the crimes committed’ and the obligation owed towards Sudan in terms 
of customary international law dispensed with immunity, it could be argued that case law 
confirms the existence of customary international law.331 This was notable in the Arrest 
Warrant case where the Court held that it 'has been unable to deduce from this practice that 
there exists under customary international law any form of exception to the rule according 
 
327 A Ciampi ‘The proceedings against President al-Bashir and the prospects of their suspension under Article 
16 Rome Statute’ (2008) 6 J Int’l Crim Jus 885 at 896. 
328 G Sluiter Using the Genocide Convention to strengthen cooperation with the ICC in the Al-Bashir case’ 
(2010) 8(2) J Int’l Crim Jus 365 at 370-372.   
329 C Jalloh, D Akande & M Du Plessis ‘Assessing the African Union concerns about Article 16 of the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court’ (2015) 4 Afr J Legal Stud 5 at 11.   
330 Ciampi op cit n328 at 887. 
331 D Tladi ‘The duty on South Africa to arrest and surrender President Al-Bashir under South African and 
international law: A perspective from international law’ (2015) 13 JICJ 1027-1047. 
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immunity from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability.” In addition, the ICJ noted that immunity 
is “one of the fundamental principles of the international legal order”.332  
 
The opposite conclusion could also be reached. It could also be argued that article 98, while 
limiting cooperation, does not remove criminal liability. In other words, the state must 
cooperate, but is not compelled to extradite the accused. Essentially this will mean the state 
must prosecute the accused themselves. Only when the state is unwilling or unable then the 
principle of complementarity requires that the state extradite the accused to face prosecution 
before the ICC. Alternatively, it could be argued that by virtue of Article 27 and the nature of 
the crimes for which A1-Bashir stands accused, the obligation owed to Sudan to respect A1-
Bashir's immunities no longer exists. 
 
4.4 Reconciling Articles 27 and 98 
 
It is necessary to consider the ways in which Articles 27 and 98 can be reconciled. One 
suggestion is that Article 27 be viewed as a waiver of diplomatic immunities.  This means that 
customary law would provide an exception to functional and personal immunity, by applying 
to treaty-based states. Therefore, case law decisions, opinio juris and state practice would 
crystalise into a customary law. Non-state parties could be brought within the jurisdiction of 
the Court by claiming jus cogens, as these rules trump all other rules pertaining to head of state 
immunity. However, this view could pose implementation problems by non-aligned states.333 
 
Another possible option could be that Article 98(1) is not applicable, when Article 97 and rule 
195 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence are read together with other provisions of the ICC. 
According to Article 97:  
 
“Where a State Party receives a request under this Part in relation to which it identifies 
problems which may impede or prevent the execution of the request, that State shall 
consult with the Court without delay in order to resolve the matter Rule 195 makes clear 
that if a state has a problem adhering to request in terms of article 98, it needs to provide 
relevant information to assist the court in making a decision.” 
 
332 Tladi op cit n333 at 1041. See Arrest Warrant supra para 58. 




This was the position in the Al-Bashir case, when state parties were requested to cooperate, 
they had already agreed to allow the Court to settle any dispute relating to judicial functions in 
terms of Article 119. Therefore, the Court would decide whether a request creates conflicting 
obligations.  
 
For example in the cases of Malawi, Chad, DRC and SALC, the courts tried to claim customary 
law status to avoid arresting Al-Bashir. In Malawi, the Court simply indicated there was no 
conflict between its obligations to Sudan and to the ICC and chose not to apply Article 98. It 
also did not give a valid reason as to why this was so. Similarly, in the DRC and SALC cases, 
the Pre-trial chamber II of the ICC endorsed this customary law position. While the chamber 
noted that personal immunity can arise at national level, Article 27(2) applies to state parties. 
This claim to customary law status is problematic in light of absent state practice and also the 
blatant dismissal of Article 98. De Wet is of the view that the reason for the failure of the Pre-
trial chamber in the DRC case and failure to openly criticise the decision of the Pre-trial 
chamber in Malawi’s case is because a chamber of an international criminal court and tribunal 
does not openly criticise a decision of a different chamber even for the appeal chamber. As this 
author has noted, “this reality might be unsatisfactory from an intellectual point of view but it 
is the reality of international adjudication”.334 What is clear is that it does not appear as if these 
cases provide uniform agreement as to how Article 98 should be interpreted.335  
 
In the SALC case, two reasons were provided for conceding that Al-Bashir enjoyed immunity: 
both customary law and also on the basis of the Article VIII (1) of the host agreement concluded 
with the African Union.336 In terms of the South Africa government, “section C and D, Article 
V& and VI of the agreement” did authorise them to observe head of state immunity. Second, 
the agreement demanded immunity, both personal and functional. Irrespective of the fact that 
the host Agreement did grant immunity for a head of state, South Africa as a state party to the 
Rome Statute cannot rely on such an agreement as a source of defence. The reason for such 
view is because South Africa, unlike some other countries, had implemented the statute into 
domestic legislation and therefore in terms of Section 4(3) of the Implementation Act of the 
 
334 De Wet op cit n215 at 8, 9. 
335 De Wet op cit n215 at 8, 9. 
336 Swanepoel op cit (n317) 177, see also SALC case para 42. 
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Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,  the domestic court of South Africa is 
provided with certain jurisdictions.337  
 
The host agreement cannot override the agreement which South Africa had entered into in 
terms of the Rome Statute and subsequent Implementation Act. The Court’s response to the 
customary international law argument was very clear. Not only does section 4(1)(a) of DIPA 
provide that ‘a head of state enjoys the immunity that heads of state enjoy in accordance with 
the rules of customary law’ but further section 232 clearly set out that customary international 
law is law in the Republic, unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of 
Parliament.338 Although this contention was rejected by the North Gauteng High Court, since 
immunity can never be recognised for crimes of a serious international nature, it still renders 
the meaning of certain sections of DIPA unclear. Does section 4 of DIPA still recognise 
customary international law immunity for heads of state?339 Section 6(1)(b) seems to suggest 
so. According to this section, “representatives of any state, participating in an international 
conference or meeting convened in the Republic enjoy ... such privileges and immunities as ... 
are specifically provided for in any agreement entered into for that purpose.”340 The above 
discussion suggests a clear conflict in the different pieces of legislation at domestic level.341 
 
Further, in terms of section 233, it should be noted that this section requires both domestic law 
and international law to be in alignment. This essentially means that “when interpreting any 
legislation, every court must prefer any reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is 
consistent with international law over any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent with 
international law.” There should also be “consistency in interpretation”. Therefore, the purpose 
of section 233 is to ensure that South Africa complies with its international obligations. South 
Africa’s obligations are similar to that of Malawi’s. For example, South Africa is also dualist 
in nature, thus this means that international agreements entered into must automatically form 
 
337 In terms of this section, South Africa would have jurisdiction over a crime committed outside its territory if; 
1. That person is a South African citizen or  
2. That person is not a South African Citizen but is ordinarily resident in the republic or 
3. That person, after the commission of the crime, is present in the territory of the republic or that 
person has committed against a South African citizen or against a person who is ordinarily 
resident in the Republic.” 
338 Section 4(1)(a) of the DIPA provides that a head of state enjoys the immunity that 'heads of state enjoy in 
accordance with the rules of customary international law'.  
339 Tladi op cit n333 at 1045. 
340 Tladi op cit n333 at 1046. 
341 Tladi op cit n333 at 1046. 
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part of the country’s laws unless domesticated.342 Article 231(4) confirms the dualist character 
of the national legal order in terms of treaties. Further, section 172 also allows the court to set 
aside unconstitutional subordinate legislation without requiring subsequent confirmation of the 
unconstitutionality by the Constitutional Court. Therefore, it is upon such basis that South 
Africa became bound to the obligations under the ICC Statute, both at international and national 
level. Further, there is still a duty placed on South Africa in terms of Article 86 as a member 
state to the Rome Statute to cooperate with the Court. The host agreement although important, 
was seen as subordinate to the Implementation Act and was implemented at domestic level 
This is further confirmed by section 10(9) of the Implementation Act which states that the “fact 
that a person is, inter alia, a head of state ‘does not constitute a ground for refusing to issue an 
order’ for surrender” and “thereby excluding the effects of article 98.”343 
  
Apart from the Implementation Act of the Rome Statute, DIPA in section 5(3) also sets the 
extent to which immunity in terms of customary international law can be relied upon. The state 
host agreement was never domesticated through a parliamentary process. Instead, immunity 
was implemented throughout the duration of the AU summit, along with the host state 
agreement, by means of subordinate legislation.344 Further, with regards to the Security Council 
resolution, the argument was that such rules are not applicable to domestic rules or legal orders, 
and the main reason for this was because the Security Council resolutions did not stem from 
an act of Parliament. However, it could be argued that an exception can be made, and that the 
resolution be applied on an ad hoc basis.345 
 
Such a resolution is argued to have significant persuasive power in line with section 233 of the 
Constitution, as well as its own Chapter VII-based character. From the above discussion, it 
would seem as if theorists such as De Wet are of the view that the position is not yet settled. 
This is because as a proper pattern has not yet emerged, and this was discussed after re-
 
342 Section 211 of the Constitution of Malawi 1996 provides that:  
“(1) Any international agreement entered into after the commencement of this Constitution shall form 
part of the law of the Republic if so provided by or under an Act of Parliament; (2) Binding 
international agreements entered into before the commencement of this Constitution shall, continue to 
bind the Republic unless otherwise provided by an Act of Parliament; (3) Customary international law, 
unless inconsistent with this Constitution or an Act of Parliament, shall form part of the law of the 
Republic.” 
343 Section 10(9) of the implementation Act, discussed in Tladi op cit n333 at 1046. 
344 Section 5(3) of the DIPA permits the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation to engage in ad hoc 
immunity agreements and implement them by means of ministerial notice. 
345 De Wet op cit n215 at 9. 
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examining the Pre-trial chamber II and the domestic law decision. Therefore, in line with the 
Resolution 1593, the Court’s interpretation should be in line with the judicial decisions and be 
reasonable. In the North Gauteng High Court, it was noted that the unincorporated African 
Union decisions, such as “the refusal to surrender sitting heads of state, would, at best, hold 
persuasive power in South Africa. However, whatever persuasive character such a decision 
may have is diminished in light of Resolution 1593”.346  
 
Therefore, it was required of South Africa to interpret its obligation in terms of Article 103 of 
the United Nations Charter. Further, the same procedure would be implemented during the 
interpretation of domestic law. In other words, such laws must be interpreted in accordance 
with the international obligations. Further, in case of a conflict of obligations, it will be required 
at international level for South Africa to give precedence to the implications of the Resolution 
in accordance with Article 103 of the United Nations Charter.  
 
Thus in conclusion, the international obligations which South Africa has in terms of immunities 
contained in the OAU Convention, and which were referred to by the host state agreement, was 
seen as secondary legislation. Therefore, any conflict between these immunities (host 
agreement) and Article 10(9) of the Implementation Act necessarily means that the latter would 
prevail and South Africa would not be relieved of its obligation to arrest and surrender A1-




The Sudan case raised many questions in relation to the principle of immunity accorded to a 
head of state, as well as the relationship of non-state parties to the ICC and other states. The 
above discussion demonstrates that the courts have not been able to arrive at an agreement with 
state parties on the interpretation of Article 98 and its relationship with Article 27 and the 
obligations that this article presents to member states to the ICC. Furthermore, customary 
international law head of state immunity could no longer be raised as a defence. Thus, what 
has become apparent is that state parties to the Rome Statute, are expected to abide by their 
duties to the Court, in an effort to end impunity for crimes of the most serious nature in 
international community. Therefore, it could be expected that countries such as Malawi, Chad, 
 
346 De Wet, op cit n215 at 8, 9, see   Southern Africa Litigation Centre v Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development  (27740/2015) [2015] ZAGPPHC para 28. 
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DRC and Jordan and South Africa had an obligation to arrest Al-Bashir and were expected to 
utilise any method necessary to meet their obligations. It has also been demonstrated that any 
obligations that state parties have, are subordinate to the precepts of the Rome Statute. This has 
been demonstrated in the case of South Africa, where their obligation towards the ICC has been 
clarified by means of various pieces of legislation, which have been implemented, such as the 
Implementation Act, and the Genocide Convention, signalling its commitment towards the 
ideals of the Rome Statute. 
 
This leaves states parties with one other option, that of withdrawing membership to the ICC. 
What is apparent from the above discussion is that both state parties and non-state parties alike 
have now been brought within the purview of the jurisdiction of the Rome Statute of the 





Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The primary objective of this research was to address the following: the current position in 
customary international law on sovereign immunity in the context of international criminal 
law; the circumstances under which the ICC can exercise jurisdiction over a non-state member; 
Security Council Resolution 1593 over Sudan, and the effect of this resolution on the sovereign 
immunity that Al-Bashir as a former head of state enjoyed under customary international law. 
Finally, the interrelationship between Articles 27(2) and 98(1) of the Rome Statute, and how 
Security Council Resolution 1593 resolves the apparent tension between these articles was 
considered. 
On an analysis of the development of international law since World War II, the following 
conclusions can be drawn. The Arrest Warrant case played a critical role in developing the 
principles of personal immunity. The problem with this case was that its importance could be 
found in an obiter remark, poorly explained and elaborated on by the ICJ, whereby it created 
an implied exception, in terms of customary international law, whereby personal immunity was 
not available before international courts such as the ICTR, ICTY and ICC.347 Instead of 
focusing on this remark, international courts chose to rely on other legal bases upon which to 
hold perpetrators liable.348  
Further, the lack of clarity surrounding whether personal immunity was excluded, was 
compounded by a lack of state practice on the matter. However, with regards to the question 
of sovereign immunity and its application, it can be concluded that sovereign immunity is 
applicable and still applies.  
Further, the statutes of various international tribunals/courts have, however, “eliminated” 
immunity, and therefore it is expected of member states to align their domestic law with their 
responsibilities towards the ICC. This has been demonstrated by confusing cases such as 
Malawi,349 Chad,350 DRC 351 and SALC.352 The reason for this could be ascribed to the ICC 
 
347 See Footnote 159, 160. 
348 See Footnote 121,122. 
349 Malawi case supra.. 
350 Chad case supra. 
351 DRC case supra. 
352 South Africa case supra. 
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commitment to ending impunity for perpetrators who have committed crimes of the most 
serious nature, rather than the nature of the tribunal that is prosecuting the offence. This 
position is demonstrated through Article 27 of the Rome Statute.  While it is apparent that many 
African states face a difficult choice between ending impunity on the one hand and maintaining 
peace on the other, it is clear that any problems that the international criminal justice system 
faces, do not diminish the importance of holding perpetrators such as Al-Bashir responsible.353 
Further, it should be noted that in light of the fact that international criminal courts and tribunals 
are not judicial organs of a particular state, it cannot be argued that they exercise undue 
influence over the sovereign activities of states.354 
 
It could be stated that since the ICC is the primary international criminal court, provisions are 
enforceable against state parties. In addition, the Court is dependent on the support of its 
member states, since it has no independent powers of arrest, no police force to enforce such 
arrests, or execute any warrants of arrest. It is therefore reliant on member states for such 
execution.355 According to Oguno, subjecting non-state parties to ICC or domestic court’s 
jurisdiction only where there is a waiver by state parties, is considered a ‘lazy’ development on 
the part of the drafters of the Rome Statute.356 This is because no head of state wanted for the 
crime of genocide, for example, will waive his or her own immunity. In addition, it has been 
acknowledged that since the ICC is a treaty-based court, it cannot create obligations for non-
state parties such as Sudan.357 unless such obligations are created and the non-state party such 
as Sudan is brought before the ICC by way of a Security Council referral. This answers the 
questions with regards to the circumstances under which the ICC can exercises jurisdiction 
over a non-state party. 
The Security Council as discussed in Chapter 3, has the power to refer a case to the jurisdiction 
of any court, whether domestic or that of the ICC, thereby bringing Sudan within the realm of 
the ICC’s jurisdiction. This could be done through the delegation of the Security Council’s 
Chapter VII power to the ICC, thereby demanding cooperation from Sudan. It could bind Sudan 
to the Rome Statute and Article 27(2) through a Chapter VII Resolution of the Security 
 
353 See footnote 26 of chapter 2. 
354 See Charles Taylor case, Taylor/Appeal/059/SCSL-03-01-I-059. para 1. 
355 Ibid 339. 
356 Oguno op cit n34. See footnote 293. 
357 Footnote 184. 
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Council. Last, it had the option of removing the immunity of Al-Bashir through direct action 
by the Security Council itself.358  
 
The problem was that by issuing an arrest warrant against the Sudanese head of state, the ICC 
Pre-trial chamber did not specify how the Security Council resolution might bind Sudan to the 
Rome Statute and remove Al-Bashir’s immunity.359 This was Akande’s argument and 
therefore, I am likely to agree with his view that the Security Council should have been specific 
with the wording used in its referrals as this would have assisted in ensuring Sudan’s 
cooperation.360 In addition, the role of Article 105(2) in in the United Nations General 
Convention on Privileges and Immunity 361 must be scrutinised. It could be argued that since 
immunities under this Convention emanate from the Charter, they are binding on the Security 
Council. In practice, this means that if President Al-Bashir travelled to any country to attend a 
UN General Assembly meeting, he would be immune from arrest.362 This is clearly 
contradictory to the principle that no immunity be enjoyed in case of serious violations of 
international law.  
 
It therefore becomes necessary to find a way to resolve the conflict that exists, for both state 
and non-state parties alike in terms of their obligations towards the ICC. This is particularly 
salient in light of the responses received by international organisations such as the AU in 
relation to the issuance of the arrest warrants for Al-Bashir.  One of those actions was to 
demand that in terms of Article 16 of the Rome Statute the Security Council suspend the 
process which was in motion and initiated by the ICC.363 However, there was no response 
forthcoming from the Security Council. Therefore, in 2009, the AU further directed its entire 
membership to withhold cooperation from the Court in respect of the arrest and surrender of 
Al-Bashir, thus adversely affecting the relationship between the AU and the ICC.364  
 
358 Art. 27 of the Rome Statute. 
359 Du Plessis op cit n218 at 110. 
359 Akande op cit n221 340-1; see also The Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter and 
pursuant to article13 (b) of the Rome Statute supra note 8: referred the situation in the Darfur region of 
Sudan to the ICC in 2005, thereby bringing the crimes committed in Darfur within the jurisdiction of the 
court, the Rome statute. 
360 Akande op cit n221 at 340-1. 
361 United Nations (Privileges and Immunities) Act, 1947. 
362 Akande op cit n221 at 342. 
363 Dugard op cit n312 at 565. 
364 Dugard op cit n312 at 565. 
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Where jurisdiction is triggered by Article 13(a) or 13(c) of the Rome Statute, the situation for 
a non-state party such as Sudan, would be the same as it would be before other international 
criminal courts such as SCSL. That is, treaty provisions that remove personal immunity can 
only be applied to state parties to the Rome Statute and therefore not applicable to Sudan.365 
However, this argument could be dispensed with since although Sudan is a non-state party, it 
is a member of the UNSC. In addition, Article 25 of the United Nations Charter provides that 
“all members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security 
Council in accordance with the present Charter.”366 Therefore, such resolution will take 
precedence over other sources of law such as customary international rules of head of state 
immunity. In event of any conflict, Article 103 determines that “the obligations of the Members 
of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other 
international agreement, or obligations under the present Charter prevails.” 
 
By analogy it could be argued that the ICC has the same authority as that of the ICTR and 
ICTY since Resolutions 827367 and Resolution 955368 empowered it to carry out its activities 
under the auspices of Chapter VII of the UN Charter.369 Therefore, since the Rome Statute and 
by implication Article 27(2) which deals with personal immunity is applicable, Sudan is in an 
analogous position as a state party to the Rome Statute. It should be noted that this section does 
not eliminate personal immunity under customary law but rather prevents Sudan from raising 
it as a procedural bar since a SC resolution has brought Sudan under its authority. If immunity 
did exist with regards to arrest warrants, then the purpose of the ICC would be derailed. The 
Rome Statute therefore trumps customary international law and therefore it could be argued 
this is one way of resolving the conflict that exists.370  
In addition, the AU position in relation to the Security Council is that of a subordinate 
organisation and therefore must comply with the requests of the Security Council. In addition, 
 
365 Wardle ‘The survival of head of state immunity at the International Criminal Court’ (2011)18 Australian 
International Law Journal 198. 
366 R Liivoja ‘The scope of the supremacy clause of the United Nations Charter’ (2008) 57 Int’l & Comp. .Q 583 
at 585-589.  See also A Boyle & C Chinkin The making of international law (2007) 232-233 “where it could 
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368 UN Security Council, Security Council Resolution 955 (1994), 8 November 1994. 
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Article 4(o) of the Constitutive Act of the AU 2000 emphasises the fact that the AU must 
operate in a manner that is conducive with respecting human rights and rejecting impunity.371 
In conclusion, it could be said that in light of the fact that that many African Nations have been 
involved in the creation of the ICC and make up the largest regional block of members, it is a 
clear indicator that these member states are not in fact opposed to the operation of the ICC.372 
In addition, it would follow that more cases will derive from the African continent. It is 
therefore essential that the ICC, SC and AU cooperate to enable the ICC to operate and carry 
out its duties and functions.373 Such cooperation could take the form of ratifying the Rome 
Statute, or ensuring that states have domestic legislation in place to meet their obligations.  
It is also suggested that the AU countries do not request an amendment of Article 16, in light 
of the fact that not all countries will ratify the Rome Statute. It is therefore considered  
necessary to ensure the effective functioning of the international criminal justice system. 
Further, the Security Council already plays a role in triggering the jurisdiction of the ICC where 
necessary. Rather, it could be suggested that Article 98 be removed from the Rome Statute and 
Article 27 alone would govern the position relating to Sudan.  This would be in accordance 
with the purpose and aims of the Court: to end impunity and ensure international criminal 
justice by co-operating with the ICC in terms of Article 86.374  
Therefore, to conclude, although it could be argued that personal immunity is only ceded when 
an official leaves office, it would go against the purpose and the aims of the International 
Criminal Court to end impunity. It would also detract from the serious nature of the crimes 
committed, if heads of state were only prosecuted when out of office. It is therefore argued that 
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